BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

applicable to all spheres of Administration, which “ even without expressly disposing of the obligation to disclose the personal remuneration of the employees “, imposes on the Administration the disclosure of “information of collective or general interest produced or guarded by them“ (article 8). While accepting that the concept of “collective or general interest“ constitutes a general clause that “ includes value fulfillment not always insusceptible to questioning “, it states that it must be interpreted according to the decision of the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) which it was reported to, as the Decree no. 7.724 / 2012 did. Winning the vote that leads the trial. Issuing her concurring vote, Judge Rosa Weber mentioned that she made the same decisions and stressed that “ what is called the protection of privacy of the citizen is extremely mitigated […] when it comes to public agent s”. Judge Marco Aurélio added that “the public servant cannot pretend to have the same privacy as an ordinary citizen […] the public servant, the public agent, the political agent, are in the showcase. They are, at first, an open book. Between the individual interest and the collective, the public, the collective interest prevails. ” The reasons given by Judge Carmen Lúcia to follow the rapporteur were, in summary, that the Law onAccess to Information “ is a law that changes the Public Administration ” and pointed out that the provision of the resource “is done in the sense to ensure the effectiveness and the change of a tone and of an Administration model ”, making it more Republican. These were the reasons that founded the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court that recognized the legitimacy of the public disclosure of public servants’ salaries. 3. Analysis of the Foundations Applied in the Decision of Re N. 652.777 It seems to me that an adequate analysis of the correction of the grounds adopted in the RE 652.777 aims to define the legal nature of the legislative provisions in it, (article 37, caput, and subsection XXXIII of article 5 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil). According to Robert Alexy, the norms of fundamental rights are subdivided into principles and rules: The decisive point in the distinction between rules and principles is that principles are norms that order something to be accomplished to the greatest extent possible within legal and factual possibilities. Principles are, therefore, commandments of optimization, which are characterized by being satisfied in different degrees and by the fact that the measure of their satisfaction depends not only on factual possibilities but also on legal possibilities. The scope of legal possibilities is determined by colliding principles and rules. Rules are norms that are always either satisfied or not satisfied. If a rule isvalid then one must do exactly what it requires; nothing more, nothing less. Rules, therefore, contain determinations within the scope of what is factually and legally possible. This means that the distinction between rules and principles is a qualitative distinction, not a distinction of degree. Every rule is either a rule or a principle. 3

3 ALEXY, R.: Fundamental Rights Theory. 2 ed.São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2012, p. 90.

190