BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

that to designate the framework of our coexistence we repeatedly refer to expressions such as the “information society” or “computerized society”. The electronic control of identification documents, the computerized processing of tax data, the registration and management of commercial purchases made with credit cards, as well as travel bookings, represent some well-known examples of the ubiquitous surveillance of our habitual existence. Therefore, our individual and social life run the risk of being subject to what Vittorio Frosini has rightly called “permanent universal judgment”. Since, in effect, every citizen registered in a data bank is exposed to continuous and inadvertent surveillance, which potentially affects even the most sensitive aspects of his private life; those that in previous times were out of control due to their variety and multiplicity. 9 It is clear in this bias that the right to privacy in contemporary society transcends the notion of the “right to be let alone” which is always associated with the famous article “Right to privacy” written by Warren & Brandeis in 1890 and considered a watershed in the treatment of such matter for opening the modern debate on the individual right to privacy, separating it from the umbilical link with property and its limitation to the spatial dimension. In this context, it is undeniable that the right to privacy does not end up in its negative status, preventing interference from the State or third parties on what individuals consider convenient to maintain in their intimate sphere. It also has a positive status, Marco Aurélio da Cunha and Cruz 10 includes the possibility of deciding whether to disclose or not information concerning the individuals, which characterizes an informational self- determination. 11 We believe that this conception of the right to privacy, which is contemporary with the information society, leads to the conclusion that the data relating to the remuneration of public servants are strictly linked to their intimate sphere and are therefore covered by the protection afforded by the fundamental right. It is up to the person, and strictly to the individual, to decide whether, and, under what conditions, such data should be shared with third parties, since they represent a proper consideration for the personal services rendered to public entities and to society. In this perspective, contrary to the respected understanding of Judge Ayres Brito, in the vote that was a paradigm for the FSC’s understanding of the matter, there is no way to deny that this fundamental right exists. However, the investiture in public entities, intrinsically considered, does not suppress or restrict fundamental rights, in a generic and abstract way, to anyone without verifying any collision with other fundamental rights or constitutionally assured assets. To say the opposite is to deny public servants, without any dogmatic or normative-constitutional support, which is one of the essential functions of fundamental rights, protection against undue State or private intervention. 9 PEREZ LUÑO, A. E.: Rights humans, state in right and constitution. 10 ed. Madrid, 1986, p. 360. 10 CUNHA E CRUZ, M. A. Da: The constitutional configuration of the right to own image. J oaçaba: Editora Unoesc, 2015, p. 68. 11 CUNHA E CRUZ, M. A. Da: The constitutional configuration of the right to own image. Joaçaba: Editora Unoesc, 2015, p. 68.

194