BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

An important segment of the international literature has pointed out that corruption in general is associated with political regimes with low levels of freedom and institutional openness, which have serious problems related to insufficient levels of human development and interpersonal trust in public institutions of government. 6 Certainly in Latin America, these scenarios have been radicalized at least in the governments of: (i) Salinas de Gortari, in Mexico; (ii) Fernando Collor de Mello, in Brazil; (iii) Carlos Menem, in Argentina; (iv) Carlos Andres Perez, in Venezuela; (v) Alberto Fujimori, in Peru; (vi) Augusto Pinochet, in Chile, among others, since the reports of corruption in these historical periods were very present. 7 But it is not only in Latin America that this happens – escaping, therefore, from the biased argument that corruption affects only countries not so developed as those of the so-called First World: The systematic exploitation of public offices is not only found in rapacious elites in some countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, India or Bangladesh. It is also found in countries like Japan, and in Western Europe and North America, where vested interests take advantage of public generosity, but work in more sophisticated ways that conceal their greed. Corrupt people are found not only in South Korea and Italy, but also in the highest positions in other countries. At one time even in the prestigious Scotland Yard of the United Kingdom, in the secret services of Germany, France and Israel, in the Swiss banking and even among the credulous royalty of constitutional monarchies who enjoy access to real power, the true influence and the true leaders. 8 If in these historical periods these governments had solid, reliable, competitive oppositions and assumed their missions of effective alternatives of government, they could frighten the coalitions that made possible such corruptive activities inside and through the public managers of that time, which did not necessarily occur. That is, political reforms that seek to broaden the social and institutional control of democracy and its institutions are always vital to the fight against corruption. 9 accessed on 02/02/2017. In the same direction see FROST’s, T. G.: The Rights of Trustees to Derive Indirect Profits from the Handling of Trust Funds. In T he Virginia Law Register, New Series , Vol. 6, No. 9 ( Jan., 1921), pp. 641-650. Virginia: Virginia Law Review Stable – URL: http://www.jstor.org/ stable/1106094, accessed 7/02/2017. 6 According to the works of: (i) TANZI, V.: Corruption, Government Activities, and Markets . In: http://projects. iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/tanzi_1995.pdf, accessed 3/13/2017 and (ii) MORRIS, S.D.: Corruption and the Mexican Political System: Continuity and Change. In Third World Quarterly , 20 (3), pp. 623-643; (iii) KAUFMANN, D.: Corruption Diagnostics: A New Technocratic Framework for the Analysis of Corruption and its Implications for the Design of Action Program. In Miami Anti-Corruption Summit, Florida, April 3-4, 1998. 7 Cf. COMBELLAS, R .: The democratization of democracy . The fact is that, beyond the type of regime, corruption is more likely to arise in scenarios with presidents whose mandate is far from the logic of the responsible party government and tend to discretionary power management. In addition, there are few levels of effective opposition, under social control and low levels of freedom of the press . 8 CARBAJOCASCÓN, F.: Public corruption, private corruption and patrimonial private law: an instrumental relationship.Perverse use, prevention and repression. In GARCIA, Rodríguez N. and CAPARRÓS, F. EA (coord.).: Corruption in a Globalized World: Interdisciplinary Analysis . Salamanca, Ratio legis, 2004, p. 68. 9 In other words, political party systems historically based on clientelistic networks are more likely to

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