BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS / Šturma, Mozetic (eds)

of the legislature toward the jurisdiction of the law . In other words, the autonomy of the law and its intimate connection with the democracy-constitutionalism dichotomy requires a hermeneutic reflection on its nature based on constitutional theory. Moreover, it should be noted that defending the effective hermeneutic control of judicial decisions, regards to the fundamental duty of justification and the autonomy of the law, does not indicate that propositional activity by the judiciary is never advisable or necessary (Constitutional Justice), especially if we consider that constitutionality must be controlled, even in the worst case, through public policy. However, the defense of the substantialist and specific positions regarding the use of the constitutional court imply inexorable improvements over the traditional self-restraining positions. These positions cannot be confused with the decision-making processes and pragmatic attitudes in which the judiciary substitutes for the legislature such that judicial protagonism increases inordinately. We call this type of behavior activism. 4.1.3 Principle three: respect for the integrity and consistency of the law To prevent the self-fragmentation of pragmatist theories in general, respect for integrity and consistency includes principles that are sometimes confused with methods of interpretation and that are built over the years by constitutional theory. Examples of such principles include the principle of the unity of the Constitution, the principle of practical concordance between the norms and harmonization, the principle of efficient integration or effective integration and even the principle of proportionality , despite its injudicious use. Its functionality depends on another constitutional guarantee: the need to justify decisions (art. 93, X, of the Constitution of the Republic of Brazil). In this context, the need to justify decisions constitutes a fundamental judicial duty and a fundamental right of citizens. Because integrity is inextricably linked to democracy, judges must build their arguments in a way that integrates the law. Therefore, the interpretation process must have “articulate consistency”. Under this perspective, the law moves away from both the objectivist point of view, where “the text carries its own norm” (i.e., the law is the law unto itself ), and the subjectivist-pragmatist point of view, where the norm can overturn the text. In other words, this respect for tradition inherent to integrity and consistency is substantially anti-relativist and should serve as a shield against subjectivism and objectivism. 4.1.4 Principle four: the fundamental duty to justify decisions If we agree that the hermeneutics being practiced in a democratic state of law cannot delegitimize a democratically produced judicial-constitutional text , then the state appears to hold its judges and courts strongly accountable. This circumstance was enshrined in the Constitution in art. 93, IX, which states that a judge must specify the conditions under which he understands the law. The duty to justify not only the final decision but also all those decisions in the iter depends on the degree to which the parties participate in the decision-making process. The reasoning is linked to the control of decisions. The control over decisions depends on whether a paradigm shift occurs with regard to the role of the parties in the judicial-procedural relationship. Therefore, the judicial-procedural protagonism

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