CYIL 2010
THE QUEST OF THE LISBON TREATY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC … stated that the Treaty of Lisbon did not represent any radical departure form the existing concept of concluding EU international agreements and to a large extent only clarified and codified the results of long-term developments already previously elaborated on and settled in ECJ case-law. 50 Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court also noted that Art. 216 TFEU, due to its vagueness, was on the borderline of compatibility with the requirements of clarity and certainty that must be met by the text of a legal norm and the requirements that transfers of powers to the EU must be ascertainable. However, the Court concluded that this vagueness did not evidently reach a level that would make it necessary to declare Art. 216 TFEU inconsistent with the constitutional order. 51 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights As regards the Senate’s objections relating to the EU Charter and Art. 6 TEU, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the EU Charter would primarily bind Union institutions, and would be binding on Czech institutions only when implementing Union law. The Court also pointed out that the EU Charter does not expand the area of application of Union law beyond the framework of the Union’s powers. 52 In addition, as a result of the EU’s accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the institutions of the Union, including the ECJ, will become subject to review by the European Court of Human Rights, which will, in the Court’s opinion, strengthen the mutual conformity of both systems for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 53 The Constitutional Court also noted that the EU Charter recognizes the fundamental rights arising from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and must therefore be interpreted in accordance with these traditions. 54 It also emphasized that protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is part of the “material core” of the Constitution , where it is beyond the reach of legislature, and if the standard of protection ensured in the EU were unacceptable, the bodies of the Czech Republic would once again have to take back the transferred powers in order 50 Ibid., para. 184. 51 Ibid., para. 186. The Court clearly considered the fundamental difference in nature between domestic statutes and international treaties, by explicitly stating in the same paragraph that it “recognizes that the requirements for precision in an international treaty (obviously) can not be interpreted as strictly as a in the case of a statute , it nevertheless concluded that an international treaty must also meet the fundamental elements of precision, definiteness and predictability of a legal regulation.” (emphasis added) This distinction was confirmed in the “Lisbon II” case, where the Court said: “In this regard we must also emphasize that the subject of the review is an international treaty to which one cannot apply the requirements that the Constitutional Court applies to domestic legislation in accordance with constitutional principles. On the contrary, a greater degree of generality, declaration, and indefiniteness is typical of international treaties , as the Constitutional Court already stated in point 186 of judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08. ” (Pl. ÚS 29/09, para. 133, emphasis added).
52 Ibid., para. 191. 53 Ibid., para. 193. 54 Ibid., para. 195. Cf. Art. 52 (4) of the EU Charter.
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