CYIL 2010

THE QUEST OF THE LISBON TREATY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC … within the meaning of Art. 10a of the Constitution, and thus required consent in the Parliament by a constitutional majority. The Court rejected this part of the petition as inadmissible, stating that the “Irish Guarantees” did not constitute the part of the Treaty of Lisbon that was the subject of the review, and laid the matter to rest once and for all. (ii) Czech Accession to Protocol on application of the EU Charter in Poland and the UK As was apparent from the “Lisbon I” proceedings and their aftermath, the EU Charter has become a somewhat sensitive document in the internal political discourse conducted in the Czech Republic. To make matters worse, some politicians have purposefully misinterpreted it and presented it as an instrument which could have severe effects on the system of property ownership in the Czech Republic (this was directed solely at property ownership titles based on the presidential decrees of 1945-1946, still a very sensitive issue among the general public). When the Constitutional Court declared that it would deal with the petition in the “Lisbon II” case with utmost priority and it seemed that only the awaited judgement prevented ratification in the Czech Republic, President Klaus suddenly came up with an additional request. In his statement of 9 October 2009, he claimed that the EU Charter “ will make it possible to bypass Czech courts and to raise property claims of, for example, parties displaced after WW2 directly before the Court of Justice of the EU. The Charter makes it possible to reexamine even those decisions of Czech courts that are legally binding ”, and urged the Government to negotiate a similar “exemption” as the United Kingdom and Poland had done. 74 The President referred to the Protocol (No. 30) on application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU to Poland and the United Kingdom (hereinafter the “Protocol”) attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. The Government took this request seriously, although it did not share the President’s concern and made it quite clear that the EU Charter cannot be applied retroactively and cannot have any effects on post-war property arrangements. 75 Nevertheless, the Government declared its willingness to start negotiations with its European partners, provided that the following conditions were met: (i) the ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be re-opened; (ii) the conduct of the Government will not be disputed in the Parliament, which had already given its consent to ratification; and (iii) the President will provide a definite and explicit guarantee that upon the fulfilment of his request and an affirmative judgement of the Constitutional Court, he will ratify the Treaty without delay. 76 74 The statement is available in English on the President’s personal website: http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/ asp/clanek.asp?id=4k7raOBtIort. 75 For a thorough legal analysis of the EU Charter and its (non-existent) effects on post-war property ar rangements, see Peers, S.: Beneš Decrees and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights , 12 October 2009, available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/lisbon-benes-decree.pdf. 76 Statement by the Government of the Czech Republic on the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, available in English at: http://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/statement-by-the-govern ment-of-the-czech-republic-on-the-ratification-process-of-the-lisbon-treaty-62966/.

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