CYIL 2010

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ CYIL 1 ȍ2010Ȏ of the period did not regulate humanitarian interventions in any comprehensive manner, although certain treaties of the late 19 th century implicitly recognized the legality of such interventions in specific contexts. 4 The gradual adoption of international legal rules on the use of force in the first half of the 20 th century could have led to the legalization of humanitarian intervention. Yet, the effort to minimize inter-state wars and the negative precedents set by the abuse of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by Japan in China, Italy in Ethiopia and Nazi Germany in Czechoslovakia, prevented this from occurring. Consequently, neither the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the 1945 UN Charter allowed for unilateral military actions motivated by humanitarian concerns. In the course of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention had very few proponents. Perceived as a threat to the fundamental principles of sovereign equality and the non-use of force, as well as a potential destabilizer of the international system, it was denied legality and legitimacy by most players on the international scene. As a result, even cases that would most probably count as legitimate wars under the just war tradition, such as the Indian action in East Pakistan (1979), the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1979) or the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (1979), were justified as self-defence, not humanitarian intervention. The victory of liberal democracy in the Cold War and the rapid development of human rights ideology in the second half of the 20 th century created the conditions for a reassessment of this approach. The early 1990s saw the UN Security Council, after decades of paralysis, assuming its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” 5 and extending its Chapter-VII powers to intra state situations involving large-scale violations of human rights. State sovereignty ceased to be viewed as an absolute barrier to outside interference and UN-authorised military actions for humanitarian purposes became an integral, though still relatively random, part of international life. Yet, the increased activism of the UN Security Council was not a panacea. It left unresolved the dilemma of how to proceed in cases when man-made humanitarian catastrophes occurred and the UN Security Council was unwilling, due to a blockage of the Council by a permanent member’s veto, to intervene. This dilemma, materializing during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, was aptly described by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a series of statements made in the late 1990s. 6 In these statements, he asked two interrelated questions: “If in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act /…/, but the Council had refused or delayed giving the green 4 See, for instance, the Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey , Berlin, July 13, 1878. 5 Article 24, par. 1, of the UN Charter. 6 See, for instance, K. A. Annan, Reflections on Intervention, The 35th annual Ditchley Foundation Lecture, Ditchley Park, United Kingdom, 26 June 1998; and K. A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 18 September 1999.

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