CYIL 2012

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ CYIL 3 ȍ2012Ȏ Norway, and scholars such as Paris, 8 Lodgaard 9 and Krause 10 ) plead primarily for the change in the referent object and, partly, in the security actor. Human security should be concerned not only with states but also, and mostly, with individual persons and communities, who, unlike states, have an intrinsic and not merely an instrumental value. The main threats still consist in the use of force or physical violence as manifested in armed conflicts and in massive violations of human rights. The referent object has to be protected against these threats by adequate, mostly military means. The security should be provided for by the territorial state or, if this is not reasonably possible, by other members of the international community. Those favouring a broad definition of human security (the UNDP, Japan and scholars such as Leaning 11 and Roberts 12 ) promote the change in all four parameters. The reorientation of the concept from states to individual persons and communities, and the extension of the circle of security actors are important but not sufficient. Referent objects have to be protected against a much broader range of threats than under the classical concept of security: both the freedom from fear and freedom from want have to be granted to these objects. Accordingly, the means of ensuring security cannot be solely military, but need to encompass a broad set of other instruments as well. Either of the two definitions could be, and has been, criticized. The narrow one is seen as just another variant of the classical (neo)realist vision of security, while the broad one is viewed as too vague and incoherent to have any analytical value. The disagreements over the definition are, moreover, bolstered by those over the functions of the concept, its relationship to other concepts (human development, human rights), and its utility or added value. While each of the disagreements has its own lines of argumentations and creates its own camps, all of them reflect the same uncertainty about the scope and parameters of the concept which, as Paris aptly puts it “is like “sustainable development” – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means”. 13 This paper opts for the broad definition of human security. It does so out of the belief that even in the extreme situation of armed conflict, it is rather difficult to draw a clear dividing line between the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. The two freedoms are closely interrelated and treating them separately is therefore somewhat artificial. Moreover, testing the compatibility of IHL against the more ambitious framework of the human security defined largo sensu can provide analytically more valuable information about the degree of humanisation that current IHL reveals. 8 R. Paris (2001), op. cit. 9 S. Lodgaard, Human Security: Concept and Operationalisation, Expert Seminar on Human Rights and Peace, 15 November 2000, cit. in B. von Tigerstrom (2007), op. cit., p. 31. 10 K. Krause, The Key to A Powerful Agenda, if Properly Delimited, 35 Security Dialogue (2004), p. 367. 11 J. Leaning, Psychosocial Well-Being over Time, 35 Security Dialogue (2004), 354-355. 12 D. Roberts, Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward, 37 Security Dialogue (2006), 237-249. 13 R. Paris (2001), op. cit., p. 88.

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