CYIL 2012

JÁN SVÁK CYIL 3 ȍ2012Ȏ and interrelation.” I agree that the most recent international documents tend to replace the traditional classification of human rights by a new structure, but this does not imply that their basic philosophy has been changed. Although the scope of social duties of the state has been increasing it does not imply that those duties automatically arise from the absoluteness or universality of human rights of a social nature. It still applies that those human rights are recognized by the state as a result of its economic potential, and not based on their absoluteness as is the case of basic human rights of the first generation. Such a view can be supported by the celebration of the 50 th anniversary of the European Social Charter, whose aim was just to remind, and not to summarize positives and consider negatives as it was in the case of the 60 th anniversary of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms. Despite that, I appreciate the extensive attention drawn in the monograph to the issues of social rights, and also to minorities’ rights, which even more decreases, from the perspective of so-called positive measures, optimism regarding the equality of all human rights. The chapters possess different character and represent, not only regarding their topics but also methodology, a wide range from legal philosophy (e.g. Pinz, Kysela, Mlsna, Hanko, Zoubek) through legal theory (e.g. Gerloch, Maršálek, Klíma) to legal practice (e.g. Gajdošíková, Pikalová, Zemánek). The texts will undoubtedly serve as sources not only for other scholarly works but may also be taken as an aid for interpretation within constitutional decision-making as well as in positive law. Although the scope of topics and the number of authors are rather extensive the book has maintained sufficient consistency. Many texts will give rise to academic and scholarly debate: some of them due to their subject-matter, others because of their provocative character of expressing ideas. The latter examples cover contributions by P. Maršálek and J. Kysela, whose (not only) titles imply certain provocative features: Current Delegitimization of Human Rights and In the Basement of the Theory of Human Rights, respectively. Even the title of the whole monograph evokes this (extremely positive) nature. Without engaging in details and argument regarding certain conclusions in some texts in the monograph I will make just three notes with respect to the protection of human rights. The first note applies to a potential misuse of the Euro-Atlantic conception of human rights, reducing it to mere military intervention in certain parts of the globe, e.g. the Near East. What is forgotten is the fact that a liberal conception of human rights enabled integration of multicultural ethnic groups into Europe or North America. The second note relates to the expansion of human rights from public law into private law, which endangers one of the basic principles of liberalism, namely the freedom to contract. On the other hand, an extensive interpretation of the freedom of expression may interfere with the second basic principle of liberalization, namely ownership. The Internet may be given as example, as it belongs to no-one and everyone at the same time. Paradoxically, ownership is fulfilled through its negation.

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