CYIL 2012

JAKUB HANDRLICA CYIL 3 ȍ2012Ȏ 3.3.2 Nuclear liability rules and jurisdictional cooperation and enforcement of judgements Furthermore, there are also issues not explicitly governed at the time, either by the nuclear liability treaties or European legislation, but which – at the same time – are clearly matters of Union authority. Several issues in the area of jurisdictional cooperation and enforcement of judgments serve as examples in this area. One of these is the very urgent issue of enforcement of judgments issued by the courts of non-contracting states in member countries belonging to either the Paris or Vienna regime, as was mentioned above. 3.3.3 Which approach to address the harmonisation of nuclear liability? What is the appropriate solution, when a “labyrinth” of nuclear liability treaties faces off against a “labyrinth” of differing competencies? Clearly, the harmonisation of rules is desirable . Agreement over mere partial issues of nuclear liability may lead to some progress, but the result of such an approach leads only to creating further “labyrinths” and “sub-labyrinths” of rules that rely primarily on international conventions and hope to fill the gaps with European legislation. Facing such a prospect, harmonising nuclear liability matters in the first place and as a whole by means of European law should be favoured. 3.4 European rules on nuclear liability as an engine for the ratification of international treaties ? Towards a synergy between the “global” and “regional” approach. Let us turn our attention towards possible content of a nuclear liability directive, along with its implications to commitments of the member states arising from nuclear liability treaties to which they are contracting parties. There is obviously one approach in line with the almost unending effort of international organisations affecting nuclear liability. Several contemporary authors have already proposed such an approach that would, in general, lead to ratification of the Joint Protocol in all member states that are currently contracting parties to the Paris Convention. 50 The idea behind such an approach is as follows: the basic principle of the Joint Protocol is to create a “bridge” of mutual recognition between the two existing nuclear liability treaties. 51 Consequently, the jurisdictional provisions laid down in the Paris and Vienna Conventions apply between contracting parties. For example, a nuclear accident occurs by an operator within a contracting party to both the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocol (e.g. Germany). The contractor is liable for damages suffered 50 See Reyners, P. (2010) ‘Liability Problems Associate dwith the Current Patchwork Nuclear Liability Regime with in the EU States’, in Pelzer, N. (ed.): Europäisches Atomhaftungsrecht im Umbruch , pp.96 et seqq., Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden. 51 See Busekist, O. (2006) ‘A Bridge Between Two Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna and the Paris Convention’, in OECD/ IAEA (eds.): International Nuclear Law in the Post – Chernobyl Period, p. 129 et seqq., OECD/IAEA, Paris/Vienna.

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