CYIL 2012

JAKUB HANDRLICA CYIL 3 ȍ2012Ȏ also may set higher liability limits and virtually prepares the way toward opting for unlimited operator liability. However, nor Vienna nuclear state used the possibility to opt for unlimited nuclear liability. Therefore, should a (unbinding) recommendation, or a (legally binding) nuclear liability directive establish liability limits, comparable to those existing under the Amended Paris Convention, it would clearly encourage a wider adherence to the Joint Protocol among the “old” member states. However, it is a matter of fact that even the Joint Protocol is not a perfect international treaty and there are considerable uncertainties in its application, mainly concerning transport cases. And finally, the ratification of the Joint Protocol in all current contracting parties cannot possibly address the problems arising from the existence of non-contracting parties in the European Union. IV. Conclusions As a reaction to the nuclear accident in the nuclear power plant Fukushima Dai ichi, many member states of the European union are reconsidering their attitude concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This is one line with renewed interest of the European Commission in harmonising different aspects of nuclear law. Among these aspects, nuclear third party liability plays a very important role. The first part of this contribution clearly showed that there are considerable barriers to accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to the existing nuclear liability treaties. Consequently, the question arises as to whether we have to rely exclusively on international law for the future. Facing such a prospect, let us revisit the course of developments over the last fifty years: The Paris Convention was signed in 1960 and entered into force eight years later, in 1968. The Vienna Convention dates to 1963 and it took fourteen years to come into force (mainly acceded to by third world non-nuclear countries at that time). The revision process of both major nuclear liability treaties fails to show a more positive picture: the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2003 (only two contracting parties to that Protocol have any nuclear installations in their territory). The Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention was signed in 2004 and (similarly to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation of 1997) has not yet entered into force. Having this lack of progress in mind, doubts can be expressed about whether the European union is willing to remain a pure observer of these processes, or if it should not play a more ambitious role in the future. Therefore, in the second part, it was clearly shown that using the competencies laid down in the Euratom Treaty in the domain of nuclear liability will have considerable implications towards harmonising rules applicable in the Union. Consequently, the notion to revisit the Euratom competencies in the domain of nuclear third party liability, more than fifty years after they were laid down in the Euratom Treaty, is to be appraised. A kind of synergy between the interests of the

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