CYIL 2012

ARMED INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW religious intervention was based on natural law to protect Christians. Even F. De Martens at the end of the nineteenth century justified intervention by the “civilized powers” against “non civilized nations”. The principle of non-intervention formulated earlier by Wolf and Vattel acquired general recognition in the nineteenth century with certain exceptions to this principle, namely the right of intervention based on treaties and on the principles of self-help and self-preservation. In the first half of the nineteenth century there appeared in Europe new reasons to justify intervention on a humanitarian basis related to the ideas of political liberalism and the concept of fundamental human rights. In fact, many humanitarian interventions were often only pretext for political, economic and other reasons. 16 In classical international law forcible military intervention was recognised as a legal instrument of power politics. The so called Monroe doctrine of 1823 claimed a kind of political hegemony over all the states of the American continent and the right to exercise intervention. The so-called Truman doctrine of 1947 proclaimed a US policy on intervention against communism. I. Brownlie wrote in 1963: “Forcible intervention is now unlawful.” He admitted that the protection of nationals brings particular difficulties whenever government is faced with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number of nationals in a foreign state, a situation which would bring “cogent reasons of humanity for acting…” The possible risks of denying the legality of action in a case of such urgency in exceptional circumstances, in his view must be weighed against the more calculable dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the peace in the pursuit of national rather than humanitarian interests.” 17 W. Friedmann even mentioned “the weakness” of “the so-called right of intervention which is often used to justify older types of intervention…” He stated that there at present time is no “law of intervention”. He stressed the existence of “a general principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts” and maintained that “internal struggles are not the concern of international law”. 18 W. Friedmann surveyed the “hegemonial tendencies of the major powers” and described various regional defence organisations as, to a greater or lesser extent, “instruments of national power policies” rather than “alternative forms of international order”. In his view “various collective defence organisations have been used to justify ex post facts the unilateral armed action of its most powerful member.” With regard to “internal conflicts” W. Friedmann maintained that “international law must be indifferent to domestic and social changes”. He added that “every state is entitled to have the kind of government it chooses” and “nor can the rights and obligations of international law be linked with the method of internal change”. 19 16 Malanzuk P., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law , London and New York 1997, p. 19-20. 17 Brownlie I., International Law and the Use of Force by States , Oxford 1963, p. 301. 18 Friedmann W., General Course in Public International Law in Recuueiil des Cours Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, A. W. Sijthoff, Leyde 1970, II, p. 211-4. 19 Ibid pp. 203, 204; see also Waldock M., The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, Recueil des Cours Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, A. W. Sithoff, Leyde, 1952, II, pp. 466-467.

69