CYIL 2012

ARMED INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW violation of the principle of non-intervention poses “a threat to the independence, freedom and normal political, economic, social and cultural development of countries which can pose also a serious threat to the maintenance of peace”. The Declaration maintained that “no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of the interferences or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned…” GA Declaration 2625 on Friendly Relation of 1970 clearly confirmed the prohibition of claim to intervene and contains no stipulation on the right to humanitarian intervention. According to this Declaration, adopted by consensus by all states, the principle of non-interference “constitutes a prohibition of direct or indirect intervention for any reasons in the internal or external affairs of any other state”. The substance of this principle is a prohibition of: a) armed intervention and all other forms of interference; b) economic and political or any other measures in order to obtain from another state the subordination of its sovereign rights or to get advantages of any kind; c) measures designed to organise, assist, foment or permit subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed to the violent overthrow of the government of another state; d) interference into civil war in another state; e) the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity. The right of every state to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems without interference from other states was likewise embodied in this principle. On the regional level it is useful to mention Art. 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which provides: “No state… has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.” 23 The Definition of Aggression in GA resolution 3314 of 1974 stresses that “no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression”. The idea of humanitarian military intervention was rejected by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. The ICJ maintained that the protection of human rights as a strictly humanitarian objective cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, with the destruction of oil installations, or with the training, arming and equipping of the contras. The Court drew a distinction between forcible intervention and “strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country”, which cannot be regarded as “unlawful intervention” (para. 242). The prohibition of the use of force is embodied in the UN Charter and customary law as well. It is generally acknowledged that this stipulation represents jus cogens norm. 24

23 Charter of the Organization of American States, 26 April 30, 1948, U.N.T.S. 3. 24 ICJ Reports 1986, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgements of 27 June 1986, para. 268, p. 14, para. 190; see also Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, 81 AJIL 1987, p. 93.

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