CYIL 2013

BREGT NATENS – JAN WOUTERS

CYIL 4 ȍ2013Ȏ

1. What’s on Doha’s services table? The Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 created the mandate for the Doha Round, also known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and integrated negotiations on the further liberalisation of trade in services in the DDA. 1 After four years in which little progress was made, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005 contained an Annex C on services negotiations, which contains guidelines for negotiations, objectives and approaches, and an ambitious timeline. 2 However, the relatively positive feeling after the adoption of Annex C hushed completely eight years later, as very little progress has been made since. 3 With the Bali Ministerial Conference rapidly approaching, it is once again clear that the future of the WTO as a place where multilateral trade deals are struck may be threatened by the DDA deadlock and the recent rise of mega-regionalism. In an attempt to lower expectations and the possible disappointment with regard to Bali, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy urged Members to ‘work towards what is reasonably doable’. 4 Considering the gap in expectations between Members, this advice is also relevant to post-Bali attempts to conclude the DDA in one way or another. Especially in the case of services, there is much to be gained, as economists agree on the enormous potential economic benefits of liberalisation in trade in services. 5 Nonetheless, services do not appear to be on the Bali agenda. 6 Hence, services negotiators are surely already looking onward. However, it remains incredibly difficult to assess what is ‘reasonably doable’ in the case of services liberalisation. To address this question, this article first aims to set out the state of play in services negotiations at a perhaps crucial moment in the history of the WTO. To reiterate, the DDA mandate and subsequent negotiating practice makes clear that the most important topics in the services negotiations are the disciplines: (i) disciplines on domestic regulations; (ii) emergency safeguard measures; (iii) disciplines on 1 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Ministerial Declaration (Adopted 14 November 2001) 11 & 15. Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration expressly reaffirms ‘the right of Members under the General Agreement on Trade in Services to regulate, and to introduce new regulations on, the supply of services’, thus re establishing the importance of a balance between trade liberalization and sufficient autonomy for governments to regulate. 2 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Ministerial Declaration (Doha Work Programme) (Adopted 18 December 2005). 3 Rudolf Adlung, ‘Services Negotiations in the Doha Round: Lost in Flexibility?’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 865, 866. 4 World Trade Organization, ‘7 December 2012, Trade Negotiations Committee: Formal meeting: Lamy Urges “Credible” Results at Bali Ministerial’ (2012) accessed 15 May 2013. 5 For example, Decreux and Fontagné calculated that ‘there is more to be gained for the world economy from a 25% reduction of barriers in services than from a 70% tariff cut in agriculture in the North, 50% cut in the South, a reduction by half of domestic support, and the phasing out of export subsidies’. See: Yvan Decreux and Lionel Fontagné, A Quantitative Assessment of the Outcome of the Doha Development Agenda (CEPII Working Paper, N°2006-10, 2006) 31. Also see Antoine Bouet and David Laborde, ‘Assessing the Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round’ (2010) 9 World Trade Review 319. 6 ICTSD, ‘WTO Members Focus on “Realistic” Doha Deliverables for 2013’ (2012) 1 Bridges Africa Review.