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BREGT NATENS – JAN WOUTERS CYIL 4 ȍ2013Ȏ address the matter and that an interpretation can go both ways, however, his argumentation seems to favour a sector specific scope. 21 Another position is that the disciplines should apply to all sectors but that nothing stops Members from devising disciplines that only apply to one or more specific sectors. 22 This is evident from practice, as the WPDR has already negotiated disciplines for the accountancy sector. In the end, Members have the last word, and they seem to agree that the disciplines should only apply to committed sectors. 23 This is also apparent from Paragraph 10 of the Draft Disciplines, which indicates that Members are favouring the approach that limits applicability to sectors in which commitments have been made. Fourth, the legal status of future Article VI:4 disciplines remains unclear. Disciplines may become legally binding through several paths, for example through scheduled additional commitments. Following a Note by the Secretariat on regulatory issues in sectors and modes of supply, there was a discussion among Members to address domestic regulation in this way. 24 The statements by Members indicate that there is no consensus to adopt such a plurilateral approach, as this may conflict with the WPDR’s mandate. However, other Members appear interested in a flexible plurilateral approach. This non-exhaustive short overview illustrates that many difficult issues persist in the negotiations on domestic regulation. Even though the positions on different provisions of the Draft Disciplines are still far apart, there seems to be a consensus between Members to continue work on revising the text as they appear to agree that disciplines on domestic regulation are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of scheduled commitments. 25 2.2 Working Party on GATS Rules The WPGR coordinates negotiations on Article X GATS on emergency safeguard measures (ESM), Article XIII GATS on government procurement and Article XV GATS on subsidies. Members are far from reaching a consensus on either subject as objectives and expected outcomes of the negotiations diverge so fundamentally that it is even unclear whether disciplines should be negotiated or not. 26 It is evident that there is a basic divide between Members who want more liberalisation and those in favour of more flexibility and there is an added difficulty of misinformation and a lack of concrete data. 27 It seems that the last five years of DDA negotiations have Economic Law 13, 39 & 49;Trachtman, ‘Addressing Regulatory Divergence through International Standards: Financial Services’ 31; Wouters and Coppens 240. 21 Krajewski 137. 22 Wouters and Coppens 240. 23 Delimatsis, ‘Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services: The Best is Yet to Come’ 396. 24 S/WPDR/M/54,Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of the Meeting Held on 27 June 2012, Note by the Secretariat (31 July 2012) 14, 15, 19 & 21. 25 TN/S/36, Negotiations on Trade in Services (Report by the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Services 21 April 2011) 76. 26 ibid . 27 Alejandro Jara and M del Carmen Domínguez, ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services and Trade Negotiations’ (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade 113, 127.