CYIL 2013

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ CYIL 4 ȍ2013Ȏ terrorism” does not constitute a real obstacle because this lack can be filled by reference to the universal and regional international norms on terrorism” (p. 83). Yet, as hardly any of those instruments contains explicit references to, let alone definitions of, victims of terrorism, such a claim would merit a more detailed explanation. The suggestion that “it is possible to affirm the existence of a general concept of victim from the definitions contained in the international norms in force related to the different categories of victims” (p. 70) does not provide an adequate answer. Even a cursory survey of international instruments, including those dealing specifically with victims of terrorism, indicates a cleavage between a more extensive universal (UN) and narrower European (Council of Europe) understanding of the concept of victim. While under the latter the circle of victims is limited to persons having suffered direct harm and their close relatives, under the former it expands to cover other groups (indirect victims, first responders etc.) as well. The tension between these two approaches should be acknowledged in the book, with the consequences drawn from it both for the concept of victims of terrorism and that of victims in general. In the light of this tension, the author’s conclusion that “in international law there does not exist a unique definition of victim /…/ but this lack does not constitute a problem” (p. 89), because the definitions of various categories of victims are allegedly identical and all draw inspiration from the UN General Assembly Resolution 40/34, 2 would need to be reassessed or, at least, rephrased in more cautious and conditional terms. Having discussed the concept of victim in Part One of the book, the author moves on to analyse the legal status of, and rights accorded to, such victims in Part Two, entitled The Rights Recognized to Victims by International Norms. It is praiseworthy that, in addition to proposing a catalogue of concrete rights, the book also deals with some relevant, and often difficult, theoretical questions relating to the legal nature of the rights of victims. More specifically, the extent to which these rights are binding under current international law is discussed, in reflection of the fact that most of the international instruments relating to victims are of soft-law nature (resolutions of the UN General Assembly and of other international bodies). The author engages in a rather lengthy debate focusing primarily on the relationship between the UN General Assembly and customary law. He suggests a complicated classification of such resolutions and puts forward criteria that should allow us to determine the legal effects of what is somewhat ambiguously called “institutional norms”. Based on these criteria – which more or less overlap with the classical methods of interpretation, taking into account the text, the context, the procedure, etc. – the author concludes that the rights of victims exhibit three characteristics. First, the majority of these rights are already recognized under the lex lata of international law or, more specifically, of human rights law, as they are simply fundamental rights applying to any human being, including victims (the right to life, the prohibition 2 UN Doc. A/40/34, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 29 November 1985.