CYIL Vol. 5, 2014

JAKUB HANDRLICA CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ However, it is a matter of fact that, after the failure of the Convention, international regulation of nuclear shipping has been governed exclusively through means of bilateral agreements. As a result, such agreements de facto supersede the role of the multilateral treaty. 4. Key messages Where do we stand now with the use of nuclear energy for marine propulsion? Today six states deploy some form of nuclear-powered submarines: the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China and India. In the last few years projects to build nuclear-powered submarines have been announced in several other states, including Brazil. Furthermore, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation announced it would expand its fleet of nuclear icebreakers with new-generation nuclear vessels capable of running in both deep rivers and at sea. These new vessels are intended to become the core of the future Russian nuclear fleet. In relation to these actual developments, several messages can be addressed concerning future development of the liability regime for nuclear propelled vessels: First, experience from the developments following the adoption of the Convention showed that the states operating nuclear-powered military fleets have been in opposition to including these vessels under the treaty. Consequently, the general principles of international public law are to be applied. In general, the use of nuclear energy is included in the general obligations resulting from customary international law, which entail State responsibility to ensure that activities within their [a state’s] jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States, or of areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. Consequently, the risks arising from the operation of nuclear-powered military vessels are primarily covered by the rules of international responsibility of the states, as there is in principle no international framework for civil nuclear liability in force. Second, states willing to further develop the use of nuclear energy as a means of marine propulsion may prefer bilateral or regional treaties rather than multilateral conventions. If so, the project to create interstate subsidiary compensation funds, already discussed in the early 1960s, would be worth reconsidering. Nevertheless, taking into account the existing geo-political constellation of states using nuclear energy for marine propulsion (or planning to do so), we must face the fact that only their commitment to create a legal framework for nuclear liability in this area can lead to a successful result.

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