CYIL Vol. 5, 2014

PAVEL CABAN CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ has a “discretion with respect to the specific ways in which the protection might be provided, since the government is better placed to make sensitive decisions concerning the ways and negotiations on the international plane, which are best suited to the concrete case of the exercise of diplomatic protection”. 13 As A. Vermeer-Künzli put it, the Court therefore held that South African citizens have a right to request protection and the government has the corresponding duty to duly consider that request; the decision must be taken in accordance with standards of fair proceedings (rule of law and due process) and the individual’s legitimate expectation and may not be taken arbitrarily – as such, the decision is justiciable before national courts. 14 Decisions pointing towards similar conclusions were adopted in other states as well. The German Federal Constitutional Court found that the German government was under a constitutional duty to provide diplomatic protection, albeit it had a wide discretion in the exercise of this protection, taking into account overriding interests of the State and the people as a whole. 15 The Swiss Conseil Fédéral, in its decision of 30 October 1996, i.a. 16 came to the conclusion that, in deciding whether to exercise diplomatic protection, the government is limited by the prohibition of arbitrariness (arbitrary decision-making). Also the British courts (namely the Court of Appeal in the Abbasi case in 2002) opined that there is certain scope for “judicial review of a refusal to render diplomatic assistance to a British subject who is suffering a violation of a fundamental human right“; the Court of Appeal found the basis for this statement in the doctrine of “legitimate expectation”, which means that if the government has a settled policy or practice for the exercise of an administrative discretion (with respect to the protection of nationals abroad), individual nationals may rely on this policy and expect the government to act accordingly and the court would, in certain circumstances, be entitled to “make a mandatory order to the Foreign Secretary to give due consideration to the applicant’s case”. 17 Similar considerations were expressed by the Canadian courts in the case of Omar Khadr. 18 13 Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, Restricting Discretion: Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection, Nordic Journal of International Law , vol. 75, 2006, pp. 298-302. 14 Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4), South African Law Reports 235 (CC), ILM vol. 44 (2005); Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 13, pp. 301, 303 and 306. 15 See Rudolf Hess case, ILR vol. 90, p. 387; Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 13, pp. 286-7. 16 Décision du Conseil fédéral du 30 octobre 1996, VPB 61.75, available at: http://www.vpb.admin. ch/deutsch/doc/61/61.75.html (last accessed: 29 June 2014), („Das internationale Recht kennt keine Pflicht des Staates, seinen Angehörigen diplomatischen Schutz zu gewähren. Ein Anspruch des Einzelnen auf Schutz kann seine Grundlage nur im Landesrecht haben. Das schweizerische Recht verleiht keinen solchen Anspruch. Im Gegenteil, der Bund verfügt auf diesem Gebiet über Ermessen, das einzig durch das Willkürverbot begrenzt ist. … “); Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 13, pp. 289-90. 17 Abbasi v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2003] EWCA Civ. 1598; Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, supra note 13, pp. 292-297. 18 See for example the relevant decision of the Canadian Supreme Court – Canada (Prime Minister) v . Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44. The special feature of this case was partial involvement of the home state of the individual in the illegal conduct.

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