CYIL Vol. 5, 2014

NONǧTRADITIONAL NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW accountable. 26 At the same time, it was taken into account that escaping these same formalities is what makes IN-LAW more effective. To cope with this apparent contradiction, the concept of accountability was re-evaluated. For the purposes of the IN-LAW project, researchers distinguished between accountability mechanisms strictly defined, pre-conditions for such accountability, and other accountability- promoting measures. Research also clarified that a distinction between accountability examined at the international level (e.g. participatory decision-making, transparency, the existence of a complaints mechanism at the level of the IN-LAW body), as well as at the domestic level (e.g. domestic administrative or political control over the participants in the IN-LAW process, domestic review, and notice and comments procedures before international guidelines are implemented, etc.) was useful. 27 Notwithstanding significant efforts made by the IN-LAW scholars, many questions related to the accountability of IN-LAW remain unresolved. For example, if it is the very nature of IN-LAW to be informal, how can it include formal, institutionalized accountability mechanisms? 28 Moreover, the informality of international instruments raises the question what actors should be held accountable, to whom they must be held accountable, and who is responsible for holding relevant actors accountable. Given the informal nature of IN-LAW, especially at the international level, little authority (if any) is formally delegated. Therefore, internal or delegation accountability is less likely to play out internationally as opposed to domestically (e.g., domestic regulators participating in IN-LAW being held accountable by their supervising domestic ministries or parliaments). IN-LAW scholars have been looking for ways to reconnect international legal scholarship with the ‘real world’ and the many interesting informal normative processes that shape it and make it more interconnected and inclusive. This exercise is vital given the realities of international cooperation in the 21 st century, but far from obvious to operationalize. Accepting a role for informal processes in lawmaking and global governance is one thing; assessing the impact of fundamental constitutional principles (such as accountability) in relation to these processes and their output quite another. The core difficulty when operationalizing accountability of IN-LAW bodies is that it may be challenging for any actor to be fully accountable. Solutions proposed by IN-LAW scholars therefore promote both domestic and international control mechanisms. 26 Benvenisti, E., “Coalitions of the Willing and the Evolution of Informal International Law”. In: Calliess, Ch., Nolte G., Stoll, P. (eds.), Coalitions of the Willing – Avantgarde or Threat? , Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2007, pp. 1-23; Kingsbury B., Stewart, R., “Legitimacy and Accountability in Global Regulatory Governance: The Emerging Global Administrative Law and the Design and Operation of Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations”. In: Flogaitis, S. (ed.), International Administrative Tribunals in a Changing World , London: Esperia Publications, 2008, pp. 193-220. 27 Corthaut, T., Demeyere, B., Hachez, N., Wouters, J., “Operationalizing Accountability in Respect of International Informal Lawmaking Mechanisms”. In: Informal International Lawmaking , op. cit. 19, p. 21-22. 28 Duquet, S., Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R.A., Wouters, J., “Upholding the Rule of Law in Informal International Lawmaking Processes”, The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law , 2014, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 75-95.