CYIL 2014

ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BOUND BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS… understood as a form of permanent international cooperation, created as an organized entity on the basis of an instrument 25 governed by international law, possessing at least one organ with a will distinct from that of its founding members in order to achieve purposes for which it was created . I identify myself also with the “caveat” of Jan Klabbers , according to which it is nearly impossible to define “international organisation” in a comprehensive (and abstract) way. But, as he adds, when we see one, we usually can identify it as such. 26 International organisations became the decisive aspect of institutionalisation of the cooperation of States in the last century, inter alia , because they can be created for nearly any purpose and endowed with competences adequate to their functions. 27 But the post-World War II era is characterized by a remarkable shift in the understanding of international organisations from being purely “vehicles” of their member states’ interests in narrowly determined areas 28 to multifunctional entities vested with greatly increased functions and competences which concern many areas of vital interest for the international community. 29 In the course of this process international organisations became more independent from their Member States – in legal and extra-legal terms. In legal terms, they are not anymore understood as a “speaking tube”, i.e. as an instrument used to express the consolidated will of its members. Such an entity could be considered to be an international collegial organ acting on behalf of its members, but not an international organisation. Today, they are considered to be separate legal persons under international law as they carry out activities resulting from their own will created by their own organs . Their own will and conduct are accepted as belonging to the group of common denominators of various definitions of the term “international organisation”, but, more importantly, they reflect and signify the autonomy of the organisation and its ability to conduct activities on its own. And it is this ability other sources cf . SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, Ignaz, LOIBL, Gerhard. Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen einschliesslich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften . 7. Auflage. Köln: Carl Heymanns, 2000, para. 0105; SCHERMERS, Henry G., BLOKKER, Niels M. International Institutional Law: Unity within diversity . 4. ed. Boston/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003, pp. 26-37, paras. 33-45. AMERASINGHE, Chittharanjan F. Principles of the institutional law of international organizations . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 9-11. 25 The term „international instrument“ appears more suitable as the founding instrument does not have to constitute an international agreement. This was the case with the UNICEF, which was created by the UN GA Resolution 57 [I] from 11. December 1946. But for example in the case of the OSCE, there is no founding instrument at all. 26 KLABBERS, Jan. An introduction to international institutional law . 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 6. 27 KLEIN, Eckart. Die Internationalen und Supranationalen Organisationen. In: VITZTHUM, Wolfgang Graf (Hrsg.). Völkerrecht . 2. Auflage. Berlin: De Gryuter, 2001, p. 273. 28 Cf. especially the forerunners of international organisations, such as the river commissions, e.g. the Rhine Commission, European Commission for the Danube, etc. 29 With regard to the influence of international organisations on international law see for example: BOTHE, Michael, et al. Völkerrecht . Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (Hrsg.). 2. Auflage. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001, p. 279 et seq.

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