CYIL Vol. 5, 2014

VERONIKA BÍLKOVÁ CYIL 5 ȍ2014Ȏ intervention”. .38 These States are particularly suspicious of, and hostile towards, the proposals of introducing explicit criteria for UN-mandated R2P military operations, of having the system of control of these operations enhanced, and of understanding the three pillars in a sequencing manner. Moreover, the Global North has doubts as to the appropriateness of using the R2P context to discuss broader political questions, especially that of the UN Security Council reform. The mistrustful stance of the Global South, or some parts of it (China, India, South Africa) stems, on the other hand, from the fact that RwP accepts a relative, conditional understanding of sovereignty, conceptualizing sovereignty as responsibility, not as a right. The two groups of states seem to share the assessment of RwP as a new concept, differing in some important aspects from that of R2P. Yet, is it truly the case? The section will first give a negative answer to this question, before offering some possible explanations of the critical reactions that RwP has received at the international scene. Starting with the first reading of RwP, it is possible to say that there is a large overlap with R2P as defined in the 2005 Outcome Document and, partly, in the 2001 ICISS report.TheOutcomeDocument stresses the need to consider R2P “bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law” (par. 139). This reference is vague and, moreover, does not relate to the implementation of R2P under the three pillars but to the UN General Assembly debate of the topic. Yet, it confirms the conviction of the international community that R2P cannot derogate from international standards. While the Outcome Document is silent as to what these standards are, it would be difficult to deny that in the course of a military action under R2P, such standards encompass, as a minimum, applicable rules of international humanitarian law and, if applicable, of international human rights law. The 2001 ICISS report was explicit on this point, ranking “adherence to international humanitarian law” among the operational principles of R2P. The situation is more complicated as far as the just war criteria and the monitoring principles are concerned. The ICISS report uses the criteria as indicators which the UN Security Council should take into account when deciding upon the use of force under R2P. The Outcome Document, on the contrary, fails to include the criteria altogether. This omission was officially justified by the uniqueness of each situation. Yet, in reality, it is more likely that the criteria were left aside in reflection of the interest of great powers not to bind their hands in advance. The discussions over the military intervention in Libya and over the lack of such an operation in Syria have, however, shown again how useful such criteria could be. Bringing them back to the fore is thus one of the merits of RwP, which immediately links the concept back to the original ideas behind R2P, at least as this was conceived under the 2001 ICISS report. In this context, one solely has to express regrets that Brazil has not done more to make the criteria clearer and better adapted to UN-authorised operations. The 38 Oliver Stuenckel, Brazil as a norm interpreneur: the Responsibility While Protecting, in Eduarda P. Hamann and Robert Muggah (eds.), Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New Directions for International Peace and Security?, Igarapé Institute, Brasília, 2013, p. 59.

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