CYIL 2015

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY the use of MAP as a specific technique to help infertile couples to embody their desire to procreate. But it is questioning the conditioning of this technique with respect to the development of embryos. Two issues are at stake during MAP – the quality of the embryos and the fate of un-used embryos. In the case of natural procreation, there is a natural selection in the quality of gametes (ova and sperms). The same applies for the first moment of an embryo’s existence (a human being – human race embryo) before and even after a natural implantation (in the womb). This natural selection is substituted artificially and to obtain at least two suitable embryos for artificial implantation, nine to twelve ‘procreations’ are needed. From the perspective of the individualistic human rights’ approach, MAP is fulfilling an individual’s desire to procreate, letting a third person select a quality embryo, to the detriment of other embryos which were not judged to be of sufficient quality. Without entering into specific questions such as chromosomic or chromatic aberration issues or, more generally, issues of eugenics, it is evident that the technique of MAP does not correspond to the over-all conception of human dignity. In this regard, it is quite impossible to apprehend how the existence of one (qualified) embryo can be compared to the existence of others. The concept of human dignity is far from being employed for embryos, but from the perspective of those who carry out MAP it cannot correspond to human schemes. This issue was tackled most in the case Costa and Pavan, 79 where the Court¨ handled a question of the right to have a child unaffected by a disease 80 and so the possibility of eliminating those embryos which were not of a required quality. From the individualistic point, one can understand the pain and sorrow of those who take these issues into consideration; however, from the point of view of the over all concept of human dignity, it is difficult to accept that States should have some positive obligation in this regard. 5. Conclusion We could see that the Court in its jurisprudence relating to reproductive rights is developing the concept of human dignity in its entirety only a little. It promotes an individualistic approach to human dignity stemming from an element of individual liberty to be opposed to a State’s power (not to say its oppression). In cases with regard to procreation the Court is often reluctant to present deeper juridico-philosophical argumentation on these very delicate issues and has left it up to the States’ assessment. Although the Court has never been directly asked to rule on the interconnection between reproductive rights and human dignity, it has had, however, the possibility,

79 Costa and Pavan v. Italy (no. 54270/10), 28 August 2012. 80 Ibid . para 58.

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