CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ HYBRID THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW energy flows) that support critical social functions (‘acquired values’ in security terms).” 39 Provided examples are oil supplies to armies, energy infrastructure, renewable energy sources, energy ‘services’, energy export revenues etc. As to the third question posed by security theories, “From what threats?” , it speaks about the threats to energy security. “While the analysis of disruptions has always been central to energy security studies” 40 , the focus can be expanded from the causes of disruptions to the ability to respond to them, that is, to energy system resilience. Konoplyanik and Walde stress that the object of energy security is “continuous assurance of an adequate, reliable supply of energy at a reasonable cost at any given moment of time in the short and long run.” 41 They stress that any interruptions in such flow of energy in many instances negatively affect consumers and producers, also states of transit. Thus the vulnerability has to be reduced as far as possible. 42 As the example of threats and working towards resilience, in the European Union, “the most pressing energy security of supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external supplier.” 43 According to the calculations of European Commission, for six member states, Russia is a single external supplier for their entire gas imports and three of those Member states use natural gas for more than a quarter of their total energy needs. “In 2013 energy supplies from Russia accounted for 39% of EU natural gas imports or 27% of EU gas consumption; Russia exported 71% of its gas to Europe with the largest volumes to Germany and Italy.” 44 To test the real situation in Europe and as part of its energy strategy, energy security stress tests were carried out in 2014. Two energy supply disruption scenarios were simulated for period of one or six months: a complete halt of Russian gas imports to the EU; and a disruption of Russian gas imports through the Ukrainian transit route. The tests showed the vulnerability of EU during such scenario, as such situation would have a substantial impact on the EU, especially to the Eastern EU countries and Energy Community countries. But nevertheless the tests carried out also indicated that consumers would remain supplied even in the event of a six month gas disruption if all countries cooperated with each other. 45 European Union also stresses the vulnerability of the energy sector to cyber threats. European Commission stresses in its Communication on Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats that “the emergence of smart homes and appliances and the development of the smart grid, increasing digitalisation of the energy system also results in an increased vulnerability to cyberattacks.” 46 On the European level, the Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is established which fosters collaboration among operators in the energy sector. The 39 Ibid, p. 418. 40 Ibid. 41 KONOPLYANIK Andrei, WALDE Thomas, Energy Charter Treaty and Its Role in International Energy, 24 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 523 (2006), p. 529. 42 Ibid. 43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “European Energy Security Strategy” 28 May 2014. COM (2014) 330 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX: 52014DC0330&qid=1407855611566 [accessed 31 May 2019]. 44 Ibid. 45 European Commission. Energy security strategy. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and- energy-union/energy-security-strategy [accessed 31 May 2019]. 46 Joint Communication, op. cit. 20.

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