CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ THE FIGHT AGAINST STEREOTYPES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EUROPEAN … perspective of European minority protection, a systematic and consistent approach to the issue of stereotypes and prejudices is lacking. However, current developments in jurisprudence, and in particular the activities of human rights organizations in various political and monitoring bodies, indicate the relevance of the fight against negative stereotypes and prejudices in the light of equality and non-discrimination. In this context, combating stereotypes may become an important part of European anti-discrimination law. Such a perspective can certainly enrich the current standard of minority protection. However, the case law, analyzed in this contribution, has shown that the application of a legal concept of stereotyping will not be easy in judicial practice. The results of our analysis are somewhat mixed. We may point at the problem of the relationship between stereotypes and the so-called common sense, to which British courts referred in the case of passenger checks at Prague Airport. Certainly, it is not easy, neither from a legal nor a practical point of view, to convince public authorities to ignore true stereotypes. The enforcement of such a dogmatic approach will be even more difficult with regard to private entities. It must be acknowledged that mainly appropriate education may change our view on false stereotypes and prejudices. But, when it comes to eradicating true and rational stereotypes, the boundary between education and ideological re-education can be very thin. It may also be difficult to distinguish positive stereotypes from the negative ones as positive stereotyping of one group can have a negative impact on other groups. In summary, the legal fight against stereotypes poses a challenge to the current protection of human rights and the protection of minorities. Therefore, in any case, it is desirable that both the case law of the European courts and expert doctrine do not underestimate or ignore this problem. On the other hand, human rights law should avoid dogmatic approaches that are completely abstract from human experience and the complexities of social systems.

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