CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

ONDREJ HAMUĽÁK – MÁRTON SULYOK – LILLA NÓRA KISS CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ PRP that “would allow for a determination that instant proceedings affect the interpretation or application of EU legal acts outside of the Charter.” 72 The CJEU also declared that the proceedings are connected to national regulation implementing EU law as defined by Article 51 para. (1) of the Charter. […] As a matter of fact, if a certain legal situation does not pertain to the scope of application of EU law, the Court shall not have jurisdiction to adjudicate it, and any eventual references to any provisions of the Charter on their own are no foundations for such jurisdiction. 73 In C-45/14., Balázs és Papp, 74 the CJEU stated that the facts of the main proceedings concern Hungarian criminal law provisions, which apply in a context not connected with EU law in any way, leading to a conclusion similar to the one presented above. The difficulty of these cases was to distinguish whether the ‘implementation’, ‘execution’, ‘scope’, or ‘application’ of EU law 75 bear the same meaning and what exactly these terms mean. 76 Differentiation between these is significant, however, different approaches represent at least two perspectives for the ratione materiae scope of the Charter. As we can see from the cited Hungarian PRPs, the meaning of ‘implementing Union law’ is far from obvious in the Member State context. This lack of clarity might be due to certain contexts of applicability getting literally ‘lost in translation’. The Hungarian translation of the “ only, when they are implementing Union law” turn of Article 51 corresponds to the Member State application of the Charter “ annyiban, amennyiben az Unió jogát hajtják végre ” (i.e. “ insofar as they are implementing [or rather executing in the Hungarian text] Union law ”) (emphasis added). Also, in the original English text, ‘ only ’ might inform an exclusive interpretation narrowly tailored to the actual “technical” implementation of EU law, while the Hungarian translation ( ‘insofar as’ ) allows for a functional conclusion on implementing EU law, which is – by definition – broader; and therefore, actually in line with an extensive understanding of this notion, also offered by the CJEU in its case law discussed above. 77 3.2 What and How? – The Use of the Charter in HCC Proceedings In general, European Union law establishes an overall obligation to apply/reflect EU rules in national courts judging activities and does not distinguish between whether the application authority is part of system of general judiciary or a constitutional court. 78 This notion was recently (albeit indirectly) approved by the Court of Justice in “hard” constitutional cases like Melloni 79 and Taricco. 80 However, in relation to our focus, two aspects pondered above (i.e. 72 C-199/14 Kárász , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2243, point 15. 73 Ibid. point 16. See elsewhere: C-488/12 Nagy and Others (joined cases), ECLI:EU:C:2013:703; C-614/12 Dutka and Sajtos (joined cases), ECLI:EU:C:2014:30; C-332/13 Weigl , ECLI:EU:C:2014:31. 76 For a more detailed analysis of relevant CJEU see e.g DOUGAN, M. Judicial review of Member State action under the general principles and the Charter: Defining the “scope of Union law ”. Common Market Law Review , 2015, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 1217-1219. 77 HAMUĽÁK, O., MAZÁK J. (2017), op. cit., pp. 167-169. 78 See BOBEK, M. Learning to talk: Preliminary rulings, the courts of the new Member States and the Court of 74 C-45/14 Balázs és Papp , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2021, point 21. 75 See C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero case, ECLI:EU:C:2002:752.

Justice. Common Market Law Review , 2008, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 1611-1643. 79 C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal , ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 80 C-105/14 Taricco and Others , ECLI:EU:C:2015:555.

142