CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

ONDREJ HAMUĽÁK – MÁRTON SULYOK – LILLA NÓRA KISS CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ As argued above, most mentions of the Charter can be traced back to concurring and dissenting opinions in the Hungarian jurisprudence studied, and this is the case with this Decision as well. Imre Juhász (concurring, under [85]) adds that on top of the results of the EU institutional reforms regarding the protection of fundamental rights, the level of protecting fundamental rights as secured by EU law should have been analysed in depth, on the basis of Hungarian constitutionalism, which can be considered an implied reference to the Charter. Per B) we need to again address the issue of ‘restraint and seclusion’ argued by Orbán above, and the fact that the HCC’s suspensions orders may symbolize a paradigm-shift, pointing to ‘resourceful engagement’ with EU law. Nonetheless, the HCC’s suspension of all cases that have a fundamental rights aspect and are simultaneously on the docket of the CJEU clearly symbolizes the significance of a constitutional (judicial) dialogue, and the priority the HCC gives the Luxembourg outcome in the cases in front of them. The latest example of this is a series of 2018 cases, all of which suspension orders were issued, 89 under the rationale of cooperation with the CJEU, laid out in the ‘Identity decision’ discussed above. 90 In these cases, the reason for suspending the HCC proceedings was that PRPs had been initiated by the trial courts and the proceedings have been in progress in front of the CJEU. Another example of “Chartered references” in concurring opinions could be those of Ágnes Czine in the suspension orders regarding the ‘lex CEU’ case, where the duty of euro- consistent interpretation 91 was discussed. She mentioned that in respect of the principle of loyal cooperation under Article 4 (3) of the TEU, the CJEU made it clear in its jurisprudence that [the obligation of loyal cooperation] also extends to the courts of the Member States. With this jurisprudence in mind, I think, that the obligation to interpret norms of national law “as far as possible” in light of the text and purposes of EU legal norms is also relevant to the Constitutional Court. 92 Later, she argues that these standards are especially important in terms of fundamental rights while making an abrupt reference to the Preamble of the Charter, which she says “ refers to the Charter respecting the ECHR and the interpretation standards that follow from ECtHR case law. The CJEU enforces in its practice the requirements that have been established by the ECtHR.” 93 To conclude, in agreement with the suspension, the concurring opinion states that in the context of the case and “regarding the protection of the several fundamental rights, unified standards of interpretation should govern both the jurisprudence of the CJEU and 89 3220/2018. (VII. 2.) AB végzés (regarding the VAT Act – reason for suspension: PRPs in progress), 3199/2018. (VI. 21.) AB végzés and 3200/2018. (VI. 21.) AB végzés (the so-called ‘lex CEU’ case), 3198/2018. (VI. 21.) AB végzés (regarding the Act on civil society and non-profit organizations) – in these three cases the reason for suspension were the relevant infringement proceedings in progress in front of the CJEU. 90 Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB, Justification [63]. 91 For the extent of this duty at the constitutional proceedings layer see for comparison: HAMUĽÁK, O., KERIKMÄE, T. Indirect Effect of EU Law under Constitutional Scrutiny – the Overview of Approach of Czech Constitutional Court. International and Comparative Law Review , 2016, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 69-82.

92 e.g. 3200/2018 (VI. 21.) AB végzés, concurring opinion, [13]. 93 e.g. 3200/2018 (VI. 21.) AB végzés, concurring opinion, [14].

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