CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

JURAJ JANKUV CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ Arguments of this author are relatively clearly and precisely denied by Professor Rivera- Rodriguez, in our opinion, 35 and we are leaning towards his point of view. The reactions of Professor Rivera-Rodriguez to arguments of Professor Handl against the concept of substantive human right to environment are really complex so we will choose his reactions to three main objections of Professor Handl. The first main objection of Professor Handl as for the concept of substantive human right to environment includes the view that a human rights approach to environmental protection including the articulation of a substantive right to environment has many disadvantages. Professor Handle presents in this sense the argument that a right to environment may not address the complex and technical issues present in the environmental problematics, the argument that a right to environment merely address the social symptoms and does not solve the structural causes of environmental degradation, such as the relationship of political economy; that a right to environment does not guarantee that disadvantaged groups will benefit this strategy as it does not include economic and political reform; that a right to environment may displace other forms of legal remedy which are better suited to environmental issues, such as national tort and administrative laws and that a right to environment might attract overt opposition from polluters and national governments. Professor Rodriguez – Rivera responds to this first objection by the true statement that “(A) human rights approach to environmental protection and the elaboration of the substantive right to environment does not imply that it is the only or the best approach for global environmental protection… Effort should by made in all relevant areas…”. 36 The second main objection raised by Professor Handel against the concept of right to environment relates to intrinsic relativity or uncertainty due to its lack of definition. We agree with Professor Rodrigues Rivera that the same objection has been raised with many of economic, social and cultural rights (right to health, right to education etc.) and the problem is not fatal since international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are today in a position to effective expand the content of the right to environment. Another criticism expressed by Professor Handl that the substantive right to environment would be difficult to conceptualize as an inalienable or non-derogable human right since environmental protection involves a complex balancing and ordering of socio-economic priorities which could lead to restrictions of this right. Professor Rodriguez Rivera denies this argument by the fact that the establishment of the expansive right to environment would effectively curtail the views against environmental protection policies. 37 Professor Handl expressed three more objections to the establishment of the substantive component of the expansive right to environment: the anthropocentric 35 RIVERA – RODRIGUEZ, L. E., Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized under International Law? In: Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy , Vol. 12, No.1, 2001, pp. 31-37. We are using this article as it was published in the book ANTON, D. K., SHELTON, D. L., Environmental Protection and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 141-144. 36 RIVERA – RODRIGUEZ, L. E., Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized under International Law? In: Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy , Vol. 12, No.1, 2001, pp. 31-37 as it was published in the book ANTON, D. K., SHELTON, D. L., Environmental Protection and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 142. 37 RIVERA – RODRIGUEZ, L. E., Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized under International Law? In: Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy , Vol. 12, No.1, 2001, p. 31-37 as it was published in the book ANTON, D. K., SHELTON, D. L., Environmental Protection and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 142.

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