CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ OPENING THE DOORS FOR DESIGNER BABIES? … the question of whether and why would the creation of designer babies be morally wrong. If the answer is positive, we need to ask whether the threat of designer babies is important enough to justify forsaking of all possible health benefits of germline modification. Some arguments against the creation of designer babies, as well as other forms of human enhancement, resemble the resistance to genetic modification: both practices can be considered incompatible with human dignity or nature. Another criticism of enhancement focuses on its alleged tendency to deepen inequality between the rich and the poor when only the former will be able to enhance their babies and, in effect, create certain kind of genetic aristocracy. 87 An interesting line of argument against the creation of designer babies provides Harvard philosopher Michael J. Sandel. According to Sandel, “designing” the genome of offspring would significantly strengthen the already existing practice of hyper-parenting in which parents try to “mold” their children according to their wishes. This, as Sandel argues, diminishes the sense of giftedness of life which is crucial for healthy relationships and society. 88 Sandel’s approach was criticised, among other reasons, for assuming that genetic enhancement will be inherently connected with parental over-control. Cambridge’s Tim Lewens, for example, recognises that “Sandel’s case undermines procrustean [i.e. too demanding and authoritarian, author’s note] parenting, but this is not to say that it rules out all and only cases of enhancement” 89 . Lewens notes that “[e]fforts to enhance need not go against the interests of the child” while “efforts to heal need not coincide with the interests of the child” 90 (in cases of treatments which are too demanding in relation to the real limitations and discomfort the health condition causes). 91 According to Lewens, Sandel only provides good arguments against too demanding parenting but this does not necessarily follow the distinction between therapy and enhancement. Whether or not we agree with Sandel’s view, it shows us the example of more general fear connected to human enhancement: that it would profoundly change the way of life and even the mankind itself, and that these changes would be rather unpredictable in their outcomes. While there would be a non-negligible demand for designer babies should they become technically feasible, there will certainly be a huge societal controversy. Any attempt to legalise genetic enhancement would have to be accompanied by a broad, free, and profound societal debate. It may be argued that human germline modification, even if only legal for health purposes, will sooner or later inevitably lead to the creation of designer babies. While this notion is 87 For the brief analysis of these arguments, see DOLEŽAL, Adam. Právo a jeho regulační role v oblasti enhancement . [The Law and Its Regulatory Function in the Area of Enhancement .] In PAYNE, Jan, ČERNÝ, David, DOLEŽAL, Adam (eds.). Dobrý, nebo lepší život? Human Enhancement. [ Good, or Better Life? Human Enhancement. ] Ústav státu a práva ČR, Praha 2015, pp. 144-150. 88 See SANDEL, Michael J. The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2007. 89 LEWENS, Tim. Enhancement and human nature: the case of Sandel. Journal of Medical Ethics. (2009, Vol. 35, No. 6), p. 356. 90 Ibid., p. 356. 91 Similarly, Bonnie Steinbock argues that “[n]o doubt many hyperparents would be interested in genetically modifying their embryos, but it doesn’t follow that everyone who would opt for genetic modification would be hyper-parents. That depends, I think, on the traits chosen, and the reasons for choosing them” . STEINBOCK, Bonnie. Designer babies: choosing our children’s genes. The Lancet. (2008, Vol. 372, No. 9646), p. 1295.

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