CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES AND TREATIES ON ARMS … Outer Space Treaty of 1967 in case of the state’s withdrawal, requires only a notification to the other contracting parties (Art. XVI) without further explanation . The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR of 1971 and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of 1973 do not contain any provisions on withdrawal or dismissal. Other disarmament and arms control treaties, such as the SORT Treaty of 2002 between the USA and the Russia, contains a provision on withdrawal in Article IV (3). Under this provision, “each contracting party exercising national sovereignty may withdraw from this Treaty in three months after notification to the other contracting party”.The SORTTreaty does not contain any provision on extraordinary circumstances or on the threat to the country’s highest interests . The later treaty concluded between the USA and Russia, the New START Treaty of 2010, allows the contracting party to withdraw (Article XIV (3)) if the party decides that the extraordinary circumstances related to the subject matter threaten its highest interests. The Treaty shall terminate three months after the date of the receipt of the notification from the other party. This is similar wording to, for example, the NPT or START I treaties. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 31 of 2017 in Article 17 also contains the right of withdrawal. The Treaty contains similar wording which is contained in Article X of the Non- Proliferation Treaty; however, it does not include an obligation to inform the UN Security Council. The treaty also contains in Article 17 (3) a longer period of twelve months for the effects of withdrawal upon the notification to the depositary of the contract. In addition, Article 17 (3) contains provisions which are not included in any other arms reduction and disarmament treaties. It is a commitment under which the contracting state who becomes a party to an armed conflict within a twelve-month period, remains bound by the obligations under this treaty until it ceases to be a party to the armed conflict 32 . Under this, the provision also implies, that a state party will neither acquire nuclear weapons in any way, nor use them in an armed conflict. The provision expresses the importance of nuclear weapons, as well as the fact that the treaty is a so-called mixed instrument , which includes both an obligation to destroy nuclear weapons, i.e. disarmament, and also prohibits their use in an armed conflict. On the basis of the above-mentioned treaties on arms restriction and disarmament, it is clear that it is possible to withdraw without major obstacles from arms reduction or disarmament treaties, even if they contain specific conditions for withdrawal. This is evidenced by the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT on 10 January 2003, when the DPRK announced the automatic and immediate effect of its withdrawal. Exceptional events justifying the withdrawal from the treaty were not expressly stated in the notification by the DPRK. However, it seems that the USA’s coercive policy and the idea that the IAEA is being used as a tool to exercise hostile US policy, might be circumstances that had influence 33 on the decision of the DPRK to withdraw from the Treaty. Interestingly, North Korea’s announcement of the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 did not trigger any response. Since all the conditions for withdrawal under Article X of the NPT Treaty have not been met, the DPRK’s notice of 31 United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1, 6 July 2017. 32 If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict. 33 AHLSTROM, Ch. Withdrawal from Arms Control Treaties. Stockholm: SIPRI Yearbook, 2004, p. 773.

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