CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES AND TREATIES ON ARMS … the possibility of denunciation does not preclude the use of a different termination concept, i.e. rebus sic stantibus . He mentioned a case which was dealt with by the European Court of Justice 39 (now the EU Court of Justice). The European Court of Justice stated that the rules of customary international law on the termination and suspension of the treaty due to a substantial change in circumstances are binding for the EC (EU) institutions and are part of the Community (EU) legal order. The Court of Justice found that the Council acted in accordance with customary international law in the case where the European Council used the rebus sic stantibus clause to suspend the international treaty that contained a provision on withdrawal. The substantial change of circumstances (Art. 62) and the substantial breach of the contract (Art. 60) may be a reason not only for withdrawal from a contract but also for its suspension. 40 Treaties on arms restriction and disarmament only regulate a withdrawal . Thus, the provisions of the Vienna Convention complement the special rules on withdrawal in the arms reduction and disarmament treaties. Suspending the treaty may have practical use in cases when the state does not want to withdraw from the treaty which causes termination in case of a bilateral treaty. On the contrary, the state still wants to create time for proceeding with the state which, for example, violated a treaty or tries to invite the state to return to the terms of the treaty 41 . An example of the suspension of a treaty is the suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) by Russia by the Russian President’s decree, 42 issued on 14 July 2007, in which Russia referred to exceptional events . Russia suspended the CFE Treaty with effect from 13 December 2007. It meant that Russia did not withdraw from the Treaty, but merely suspended its implementation . This circumstance was expressed by the Russian delegation at the plenary session of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 43 on 12 December 2007. Article XIX of the CFE Treaty contains a provision on withdrawal from the Treaty, but does not include any suspension clause . In the present case, Russia indicated the events circumstances relating to the subject matter of the Treaty that are required by Article XIX (2) (withdraw) and also met the deadline to notify the intention 150 days in advance. In this respect, it is clear that Russia relied on this special provision when it suspended the CFE Treaty. Russia indicated extraordinary events 44 that could also be considered a substantial change in circumstances within the meaning of Article 62. The change of the international situation 39 Ibid., reference p. 530. 40 JOYNER, D., H., ROSCINI, M. Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime. Chapter 5 – Withdrawal from Non-proliferation Treaties. Cambridge University Press, Online publication date, October 2012, p. 2. (www. cambridge.org/core/books/non-proliferation-law-as-a-special-regime/withdrawal-from-nonproliferation- treaties/), quoted 20 March 2019. 41 Such a case may also be NATO’s calls upon Russia to adhere to the INF Treaty of 1987. In this case, however, these are calls within the six-month deadline following the announcement by the United States of withdrawal from the The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. 42 Britské listy dated 15 July 2007 in: www.blisty.cz (quoted 10 June 2008). 43 OSCE. Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation. FSC.JOUR/539 12 December 2007. 44 The Russian President’s Decree of 14 July 2007 stated that the necessity of suspending the implementation of the CFE Treaty is subject to the following exceptional events affecting Russia’s security: (a) avoiding changes in the composition of groups of states participating in the CFE Treaty i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania; (b) with reason (a) is related exceeding the group restrictions on the CFE Agreement; (c) the negative impact of the planned deployment of conventional forces in the territories of Bulgaria and Romania on compliance with the CFE Group’s limitations; (d) failure to fulfil the political commitment to accelerate the ratification of the

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