CYIL vol. 10 (2019)

BIRUTĖ PRANEVIČIENĖ – VIOLETA VASILIAUSKIENĖ CYIL 10 ȍ2019Ȏ campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats.” 19 NATO establishes that hybrid threats are an “increasing challenge from both state and non-state actors”. 20 The hybrid activities used by those actors “aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between peace, crisis, and conflict.” 21 In 2016 NATO stated that hybrid tactics are where “a broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures, are employed in a highly integrated design by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives.” 22 NATO states that “In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of armed attack.” 23 It can be noted that the hybrid threats do have wide ranging nature and are elusive. Nevertheless, Becker outlines several characteristics that are common to hybrid threats: 1) interstate nature. Hybrid threats are aimed at the alteration or influence of another state actor, using wide range of power instruments. Even though hybrid activities are often carried out through covert methods or by proxies, usually those non-state actors are influenced by a state actor which denies its involvement. 2) asymmetric nature. Usually it is the “weaker party that engages in non-military hybrid activities in order to avoid the opponent’s superior military strength, and in covert hybrid activities so to lower the risk of retaliation. Political objectives are pursued without crossing the threshold of war, which would allow the stronger opponent to legally use its superior military force.” 24 3) multi- and cross- domain aspect. Various measures are used, which are usually abbreviated as DIMEL (diplomatic, informational, military, economic/financial and legal instruments), and they target PMESIIP factors (political / governance, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information and physical environment). Various measures may be employed simultaneously. 4) Vertical escalation – the hybrid measures employed by the actors typically “typically move up and down the escalation ladder in what is called the ‘grey zone’ between war and peace, while avoiding the threshold that would lead to open (military) conflict” 25 , seeking to achieve military and political objectives rapidly and create a situation which cannot be reversed. 5) Probing, shaping, blurring and blending. Hybrid activities are not direct attacks usually The probing activities aim to test the defence and resilience of the target; shaping actions prepare the ground for possible future active confrontations, blurring 19 Ibid. 20 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_156624.htm [accessed 31 May 2019] para. 21. 21 Ibid. 22 NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_

texts_133169.htm#hybrid [accessed 31 May 2019]. 23 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration, op. cit. 22. 24 BEKKERS, op. cit. 17, p. 8. 25 Ibid.

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