CYIL vol. 11 (2020)

CYIL 11 (2020) WHITHER THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW? … this adherence has been continuous over the period of the last ten years, underlines the long- term character of this tendency. 39 Secondly, a clear tendency for using of flexible mechanisms under the existing multilateral instruments can be identified. Both the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention were adopted as “incentive” instruments. 40 These specific characteristics of both conventions are considered to represent a delicate compromise between the efforts to introduce any type of international control of obligations arising from the conventions on one hand and absence of such mechanism on the other. Consequently, both conventions provide for “peer-review process” – i.e. an obligation of the Contracting Parties to regularly prepare reports about fulfilment of their tasks and to present them at the review meetings. 41 The absence of any binding mechanism, enabling control of the obligations arising in the area of nuclear safety became a subject of severe criticism at the time of adoption of these instruments. 42 However, the reality of the fulfilment of the obligations, arising from the “peer-review process” shows a more optimistic picture: Altogether eight review meetings were held so far under the umbrella of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and six such meetings under the Joint Convention. The 6 th review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention was held in Vienna from 21 st May to 1 st June, 2018. 69 Contracting Parties participated in this Review Meeting, including eight attending for the first time. 43 Despite some original sceptical observations concerning the peer-review mechanism, the results of the six review meetings that have been held since the adoption of the Convention are currently considered quite positive. 44 The rate of participation by Contracting Parties in the Review Meetings is held constant in percentage participation. However, the percent of Contracting Parties submitting reports is constantly increasing. Only around 10 percent of Contracting Parties fail to attend the review meetings. 45 The positive experiences, gained by the practical implementation of the “peer-review process” during the last decades demonstrate the viability and far-reaching acceptance of mechanisms provided by both the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention. Thus, the tendency to use these mechanisms can also be awaited in future decades. 40 For a more detailed analysis of this “incentive” character, see (i) MONTJOIE, Michel “Treaty implementation applied to the conventions on nuclear safety” (2015) 96 Nuclear Law Bulletin 9, (ii) WASHINGTON, Maurice “Monitoring Compliance with Nuclear Safety Standards: Peer ReviewThrough the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Convention on Nuclear Safety” in Paul C. SZASZ (ed), Administrative and Expert Monitoring in International Treaties (Transnational Publishers 1999) 213, (iii) WRIGH, Tammy “The “Incentive” Concept as Developed in the Nuclear Safety Conventions and its Possible Extension to Other Sectors” (2007) 80 Nuclear Law Bulletin 33. 41 See Art. 20 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Art. 30 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. 42 Eg. DE LA FAYETTE, Louise “International Environmental Law and the Problem of Nuclear Safety” (1993) 5 Journal of Environmental Law 31. 43 Botswana, Cuba, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Peru, Serbia and Uzbekistan. 44 PELZER, Norbert “Safer nuclear energy through a higher degree of internationalisation? International involvement versus national sovereignty” (2013) 91 Nuclear Law Bulletin 66. 45 Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties, Final Summary Report, JC/RM6/04/Rev.2, pp. 4-5. 39 See HANDRLICA, Jakub “From the front lines of international nuclear law” (2019) 12 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 271.

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