CYIL vol. 11 (2020)

JAKUB HANDRLICA CYIL 11 (2020) While the tendency to universalism will be most probably be realized via adherence to the existing international agreements and via the instruments of soft law, adoption of new regional agreements in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is a viable and realistic option. When comparing regional frameworks with universal instruments, we observe higher degrees of flexibility. The frameworks existing in the area of nuclear liability serve as a good example. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was adopted under the auspices of the IAEA in 1963 as a universal instrument. 73 However, it took fourteen years until the instrument was ratified by necessary number of States in 1977. At this stage, the Vienna Convention covered 7 Contracting Parties. 74 However, only two of them operated any nuclear installations within their territory. 75 Until the 1990s, when several Central and East- European States, possessing their own nuclear programs, acceded to the Vienna Convention, the liability framework established under this instrument was marginal. On the other hand, the regional liability regime 76 established under the auspices of the OECD by the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) demonstrates a more dynamic instrument. Adopted in 1960, the Paris Convention entered into force in 1968. At that time, the Convention covered five Contracting Parties, four of them operating nuclear power plants in their territories. 77 In 1982, a Protocol was adopted to the Paris Convention to address the issues, arising from abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1978. At that time, the Paris Convention already covered 12 Contracting Parties. Ten of them operated nuclear installations in their territories. 78 These developments clearly show that regional frameworks, which gather States with comparable economic and political situation, demonstrate more dynamic instruments than multilateral frameworks of a universal nature. 79 Bi-lateral agreements demonstrate the same, or even higher degrees of dynamism than regional instruments. 80 These bilateral agreements are capable of establishing obligations for those States that share certain common economic, security, or environmental concerns. Thus, bilateral agreements are likely to address issues of re-processing in the future, if the re-processing technologies will emerge further. Also, bilateral agreements will constitute 73 See Art. XXIV.1. of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (all States Members of the United Nations, or of any of the specialized agencies orof the International Atomic Energy Agency not represented at the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage held in Vienna from 29 April to 19 May 1963, may accede to this Convention). 74 Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cuba, Egypt, Philippines and Trinidad and Tobago. 75 This was the case of Argentina, where a nuclear power plant was operated and of Egypt, which was operating a research reactor in its territory. 76 See Art. 21.a. of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (the Government of any Member or Associate country of the OECD which is not a Signatory to this Convention may accede thereto by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the OECD). 77 Belgium, France, Spain and Sweden. 78 Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 79 For a review of the flexible mechanisms, provided by the Paris Convention, see HANDRLICA, Jakub “Nuclear liability conventions and decommissioning: Exclusion provisions revisited” (2018) 11 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 196. 80 See MORGERA, Elisa “The Future of Law and the Environment: The Emergengence of Global Environmental Law” in MULLER, Sam, ZOURIDIS, Stavros, FRISHMAN, Morly and KISTEMAKER, Laura (eds.) The law of the future and the future of the law (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2011) 39.

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