CYIL vol. 11 (2020)

CYIL 11 (2020) THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN MEDICAL RESEARCH conformity with all the formulations. 85 If the maxim fails to pass any of them, the action based on such a maxim is forbidden 86 . We will use two of these formulations that are arguably most suitable for the demonstration of Kantian reasoning in the context of this paper: the formula of universal law and the formula of humanity. The formula of universal law 87 imposes the duty to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” 88 . Based on this formulation of the categorical imperative, Kantian ethics distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties. We have a perfect duty to act according to a certain maxim if the opposite maxim, should it be a universal law, would lead to a logical contradiction. For example, the maxim that anyone can commit suicide would negate life itself; or the maxim that anyone can borrow money knowing that he will never repay it will lead to a world where nobody will lend money ever again. On the other hand, we have an imperfect duty to act according to a maxim if we would “only” not rationally will that the opposite maxim would become a universal law. An example might be a duty to develop one’s own talents or to help others in need. 89 A perfect duty obliges the agent to always act to the fullest extent possible of the maxim while an imperfect duty brings a weaker obligation to fulfil the maxim to some extent and not necessarily always 90 . It would be hard to justify the claim that carrying out medical research, or participating in it, does represent a perfect duty. The world without medical research is undeniably possible – indeed, it was the world until approximately two hundred years ago 91 . However, we would argue that a rational being necessarily wills that medical research is conducted as it significantly contributes to human flourishing in many ways. It needs to be further acknowledged that research does not only require the work of researchers themselves, but also the cooperation of persons who are willing to participate. We may conclude that both actions – carrying out the research and participation in it – are imperfect duties. It is necessary to carry out research. Arguably, it is also necessary for people other than researchers to offer their help with research if needed, even in the form of participating in research as its subjects 92 . Nevertheless, since these duties are imperfect, they do not need to be fulfilled to the full extent, and they do not 85 See ibid., p. 31. 86 See KORSGAARD, Christine M. Introduction. In KANT, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. xxi. 87 See ibid., p. xvii. 88 KANT, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. 31. 89 See ibid., p. 31-33. 90 See the brief analysis in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (7 July 2016.) accessed 3 June 2020. 91 It is usually agreed that the first controlled clinical trial of the modern era was James Lind’s study on the treatment of scurvy that was conducted on the board of the British warship HMS Salisbury. Dr. Lind found out that scurvy was treatable by the consumption of oranges and lemons, making a discovery that in the future had a profound impact (not only) on the British Navy. See BHATT, Arun. Evolution of Clinical Research: A History Before and Beyond James Lind. Perspectives in Clinical Research. (2010, Vol. 1, No. 1), pp. 6-10. 92 As Christine M. Korsgaard puts it: “Suppose, for instance, I undertake a program of scientific research. (…) Furthermore, since we have a duty to pursue one another’s ends, my decision to pursue scientific research involves a claim on others: that they should recognize the value of my pursuit of this end, should not hinder it, and perhaps, under certain conditions, should even offer help with it when I am in need.” KORSGAARD, Christine M. Introduction. In KANT, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, p. xxiii.

421