CYIL vol. 11 (2020)

JAN ONDŘEJ – MAGDA UXOVÁ CYIL 11 (2020) system of preventive and repressive means was in place, which would be available in every case of threat or violation of peace and the application of which in specific cases would not be disputed by states. The above-mentioned means of collective coercion represent repressive means, while the means of peaceful settlement of disputes and disarmament represent a preventive means. However, the Pact did not contain the concept of disarmament, but it contained the restrictions on armaments . M.A. Zimmermann 26 stated that in the literature of international law, even in the womb of the League of Nations, the formal aspect of the problem of arms control was completely ignored. Instead of considering the problem of arms control as one of the elements of a broader security problem , these issues often contradicted one other or were laid side by side . For example, it mentions the French three-part formula (arbitration, security, disarmament). In addition to security, there were two problems associated with this concept. It was the independent arbitral tribunal , which only had an indirect and at the same time rather weak relation to the security, and disarmament , which from a legal point of view, could only make some sense as a subordinate element of the security, or as a precondition for it, but was not able to claim to have a separate character despite its technical significance. Ignoring the interrelationship and conditionality of these three components could not lead to establishing the functioning system of collective security in the time of the League of Nations. The precondition for the implementation of disarmament or arms reduction was, in today’s terminology, a mutual trust between states. The implementation of the disarmament required the awareness of states that disarmament would indeed serve peace and would be beneficial to those states. However, given collective coercion’s lack of functionality, the reduction the armaments could rather be expected to trigger new conflicts 27 by some states. In this context, a historical example 28 was given when Count Apponyi carelessly argued at the 1923 Council that, if Hungary had an army of half a million, perhaps, it would not even be looking for a peaceful way to resolve its disputes with Romania. The Covenant of the League of Nations contained only articles on arms control . Under Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, peacekeeping requires the minimum level of state armaments which was sufficient a) for the security of the state, i.e. its own security, and b) for the implementation of international obligations imposed by a common procedure , i.e. for the collective enforcement action in the sense of Article 16. Pursuant to the other paragraphs of Article 8, the Council was to draw up the programs for that restriction, taking into account the geographical situation and the specific circumstances of each state. These programs were to be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at least every ten years. However, the decision on the proposed restrictions was in the hands of individual governments, with the provision, that the government that approved the program, were not to exceed the level of armaments which was set out, without the consent of the Council. Article 8 also concerned the private production of ammunition and war munitions . The Council was therefore instructed by the member states of the Company to propose appropriate measures to counter the adverse effects of the private production of ammunition

26 ZIMMERMANN, M. A. Společnost národů . [ League of Nations. ] Praha: Orbis 1931, p. 291. 27 Ibid., p. 292. 28 Ibid., p. 292.

96