CYIL vol. 12 (2021)

Ondrej Hamuľák – Lusine Vardanyan – Hovsep Kocharyan CYIL 12 (2021) and its geographical extent ” . 77 Article 18(1) of the E-Commerce Directive provides for the availability of court actions under national law against information society services, allowing for “ the rapid adoption of measures … designed to terminate any alleged infringement and prevent any further impairment of the interests involved ” . The CJEU noted that in implementing article 18(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, Member States have a “ particularly broad discretion in relation to the actions and procedures ” for such measures. 78 Further, the CJEU held that given that the means and measures provided for in article 18(1) of the E-Commerce Directive were directly oriented to cease any alleged violation and to prevent any future deterioration of the conditions of the interested parties involved, no restrictions should be allowed on the scope of application of such means and measures. The CJEU also found that because the E-Commerce Directive did not limit the scope, territorial or otherwise, of the measures which a Member State could adopt under Article 18(1) or otherwise, the ECD does not prevent Member States from issuing injunctions with worldwide effect. 79 In the Google v. CNIL case the CJEU noted that neither the provisions of the DPD nor the provisions of the GDPR imply that in order to ensure a high level of data protection throughout the EU, these provisions must apply outside the EU. Although in the Piesczek v. Facebook case the CJEU found that a Member State court could issue orders that not only extend across the EU but also globally. As one can see the CJEU (almost simultaneously) demonstrated different approaches to the two EU tools, which are similar in that both require intermediaries to block or filter content available to end users. However there is no obvious discrepancy between the approaches reflected in the cases of Google v. CNIL and Piesczek v. Facebook : the CJEU in Google v CNIL did not rule out a global de-referencing order and accepted that it would be possible. 80 The CJEU analysed the issue of establishing “any limitation, including a territorial limitation, on the scope of the measures which Member States are entitled to adopt” in relation to information society services. 81 The Court stated that EU law does not exclude that these measures will lead to global limitations. 82 The CJEU point out that “in view of the global dimension of electronic commerce, the EU legislature considered it necessary to ensure that EU rules in that area are consistent with the rules applicable at international level”. 83 The Court also mentioned that “it is up to Member States to ensure that the measures which they adopt and which produce effects worldwide take due account of those rules.” 84 So CJEU gives an opportunity to national courts to establish obligations to remove information covered by the injunction or to block access to that information worldwide. 85 And this is a continuation of the trend laid down in the CNIL case, rather than shift in the Court’s approach regarding the territorial scope of the right to be forgotten. In this framework the right to be forgotten, which develops almost exclusively as a result of the law-making of the CJEU in conditions when “digital imperialism” becomes the goal of many developed countries, becomes a kind of tool for asserting its digital power

77 Ibid, para. 52. 78 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek , para. 28–29. 79 Ibid., para. 49–50. 80 Case C507/17 Google LLC v CNIL . para. 72. 81 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek , para. 49.

82 Ibid., para. 50. 83 Ibid., para. 51. 84 Ibid., para. 52. 85 Ibid., para. 53.

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