CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

MAX HILAIRE CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ international legal developments. However, one key difference is China’s determination to alter the rules consistent with its authoritarian political orientation. 49 China’s Role in the Security Council China’s role in the United Nations Security Council has evolved since it replaced Taiwan as the official representative of China. Initially, its sole concern was to prevent the United Nations from interfering in its internal affairs and avoid discussion on its annexation of Tibet. China deflected criticism of its human rights policy and protected other developing countries from international condemnation. China has become a lot more vocal in debates in the Security Council since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, China abstained from several Security Council resolutions to authorize military intervention in regional conflicts. But that policy began to change as China grew economically more powerful and became more confident about its place in the world. Since the end of the Cold War, China has been more willing to use its veto to block attempts by the Security Council to implement its mandate. 50 China has vehemently opposed all authorization for use of military force in other sovereign states, even in cases of severe human rights violations. China twice vetoed resolutions in the Security Council to impose more stringent sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria, and to grant the United Nations greater access to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. China also joined Russia to veto resolutions in the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Like other Permanent Members of the Security Council, China uses its economic influence to pressure developing countries and some developed countries to vote in its favor. This makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for international institutions to condemn China for its human rights abuse against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, or its activities in Tibet. China is currently holding over one million ethnic Uighurs in mandatory detention, which it calls “reeducation camps,” to de radicalize them. Many western human rights organizations and a few western governments have labeled China’s treatment of the Uighurs as genocide and imposed sanctions on China. 51 China has denied these camps exist and has rejected calls to end the practice. 52 After denying the UN Human Rights Commissioner permission to visit Xinjiang, China finally approved a four-day visit for Michelle Bachelet. However, the visit was controlled by Chinese authorities, and she was only allowed to visit a limited number of places. She was not able to meet with Uighurs privately and was unable to make an independent assessment of the human rights abuse of the Uighurs. 53 Ms. Bachelet has also delayed releasing a long-awaited UNHCR report on human rights violations in Xinjiang. The Security Council is not a law-making institution, but it tends to create and enforce international law when it carries out its Chapter VII mandate to maintain international

49 See generally, GINSBURG, T. Authoritarian International Law? 114 AJIL (2019), p. 221. 50 China has exercised its veto 13 times since 1978.

51 The US, Canada, the UK, The Netherlands, and the EU have all labeled the situation in Xinjiang as genocide. 52 Upon to One Million Detained in China’s Mass “Reeducation” Drive, at https://www.amnesty/org/en/latest/ news/2018/08/09/china-up-to-one-million-detained/. 53 DAVISON, H. UN human rights chief could not speak to detained Uyghurs or their families during Xinjiang visit , at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/16/un-human-rights-chief-could-not-speak-to-detained-uyghurs or-their-families-during-Xinjiang-visit.

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