CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

LYUBOMIR L. SAKALIYSKI CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ been no indication given that such measures were contemplated or pursued by USA or any of the remaining parties due to Iran’s alleged material breach. Therefore, only the possibility of USA-initiated unilateral suspension of the JCPoA between itself and Iran remains 114 , which too is conditional on material breach by Iran. With reports by the IAEA on the matter, concluding that Iran has complied with the obligations it has incurred from the JCPoA prior to the attempted withdrawal by the USA 115 , and briefly – afterwards as well 116 proving said material breach would be extremely challenging. Considering that USA’s attempted withdrawal merely alleged material breach without any substantiation to that claim, and even more so that it claimed it has withdrawn from the JCPoA, rather than suspending it between itself and Iran it would seem that the announcement in question is without any legal effect and has failed to modify the treaty relations between any of the parties to the JCPoA. Since then, circumstances have changed and there have been material breaches to the JCPoA by more than one party, but no other attempts have been made for withdrawals, suspensions or termination of the JCPoA as a treaty. 5. Conclusion This paper has successfully established that the JCPoA satisfies all the criteria of what constitutes a treaty as per already established customary international law and later codified in the VCLTs and the corresponding ILC draft articles. Additionally, the often alleged “additional” criterion of registration has been addressed and found irrelevant in general, but importantly in the present case as well. Lastly, some arguments put forward by parties to the JCPoA have been examined and found to be contrary to existing international law addressing similar scenarios. It then follows from the above that the JCPoA both walks like a treaty and quacks like a treaty.

114 VCLT (n 4) Art. 60(2)(b); ILC Report (n 22), p 253; VCLT II (n 5), Art. 60(2)(b); ILC Report (n 27), p. 58. 115 IAEA Doc GOV/2018/7, paras. 5–20. 116 IAEA Doc GOV/2018/24, paras. 5–20; IAEA Doc GOV/2018/33, paras. 6–21; IAEA Doc GOV/2018/47, paras. 5–20; IAEA Doc GOV/2019/10, paras. 5–20.

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