CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ CHARTING A COURSE TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL REGIME OF LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR… Later, as the industry matured and became economically sufficient, Congress passed a 1975 amendment to Price-Anderson which established a collective insurance pool paid into with retroactive premiums from all of the nuclear operators in the nation. 53 The purpose was to gradually replace the initial government financed $500 million compensation fund with private funds from the nuclear operators. 54 In 2005, the Energy Policy Act was enacted as another amendment to Price-Anderson, which increased the individual insurance component to $300 million and the collective insurance component to $95.8 million per reactor in 2005 as well as extending Price-Anderson through 2025. 55 As of 2014, the total compensation fund was $13.8 billion. 56 As a matter of jurisdiction under Price-Anderson, originally there was federal jurisdiction only if the NRC declared the incident an ENO applying state substantive tort law. 57 As Price Anderson claims piled up in both federal and state courts, in the spirit of efficiency, Congress amended Price-Anderson in 1988 to provide exclusive federal jurisdiction to all nuclear incidents applying substantive state law in which the incident occurred. 58 The Supreme Court has maintained Price-Anderson with minimal interference to state law. Like in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission , the Court held the states could regulate activities of nuclear power plant licensure on economic grounds. 59 The Court maintained nuclear safety and transportation and storage of spent fuel as exclusive federal jurisdiction. 60 In furtherance of the Court’s support for applying state law under Price-Anderson, the Court held punitive damages could be awarded to radiation injuries if permitted under state law in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp . 61 C. In the Maritime We have outlined the background and complex regimes of international and United States nuclear liability because of the focus of the law’s genesis pertaining to commercial electric generating nuclear power stations, but now we turn to assess the legal framework applicable in the maritime. The first convention in the framework was the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (“Brussels Convention”) never entered into force but sought to establish uniform rules concerning the liability of the operators of nuclear ships. 62 The provisions held the operator liable for any nuclear damage with a causal link, required the operators to hold insurance or financial securities over the liability for nuclear damage and provided a limit of liability. 63 Unlike land-based operators, the convention did not propose strict liability providing right to recourse. 64 53 Id. at 242–43. 54 Id. 55 Id. at 244. 56 O’CONNELL, W. D., supra note 49, at 341. 57 Id. at 342. 58 Id. at 343. 59 Pac.Gas&Elec.Co. v. StateEnergyRes.Conservation&Dev.Comm’n, 461U.S. 190 (1983);O’CONNELL,W.D., supra note 50, at 343. 60 § 6:18. Nuclear power, supra note 9. 61 Id.; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp ., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 62 HANDRLICA, J., Facing plans for multiplying nuclear-powered vessels lessons gained from the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships of 1962, 2 Int. J. Nuclear L. 313, 314 (2009). 63 Id. at 319–322. 64 Id.

271