CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

MAX HILAIRE CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ be viewed as a sign that its influence on the North Koreans is either waning or it is using the North Korean nuclear program as a bargaining chip against the United States to extract concessions from the US in the South China Sea disputes with its neighbors. The United States continues to rely on China to exert pressure on Pyongyang to de-escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula. China is the main financial backer of North Korea and buys much of North Korea’s exports. China also shares a long border with North Korea and would need to tighten control of its border to prevent smuggling. China’s views on North Korea differ from that of the United States. China is concerned about an implosion in North Korea and the flood of refugees pouring across its border. China is also concerned about a rapprochement between North and South Korea that could lead to reunification. South Korea, as the third largest economy in Asia, could be a serious competitor to China if it is unified with the North, something that does seat very well with the Chinese Communist Party. China was part of the P5+1 nuclear negotiation with Iran. It remains a key sponsor of the Iranian regime and continues to trade with Iran even after the Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran. China never saw a military solution as a viable option against Iran. It strongly favored a negotiated settlement and worked diligently with the United States and other members of the group to secure an Iranian commitment to halt its nuclear program. Soon after an agreement was signed with Iran, Chinese President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Iran and signed several bilateral trade and investment agreements with the Iranian regime. China has promised to invest billions of dollars in Iran’s oil and natural gas plants and in a railway system to transport goods to Europe via Iran in its new Silk Road Corridor, or what it calls its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 102 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine posed a dilemma for China and its traditional view of non intervention. Putin met with Xi before invading Ukraine and signed a document that said there was “no limit” to their alliance. China did not condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but instead blamed the US and then said Russia had legitimate security concerns. China abstained on a draft Security Council resolution, which Russia vetoed. 103 Although the Russian veto killed the resolution, China’s abstention was a political decision, not one that opposed Russia’s flagrant violation of one of the most sacred norms of the Charter, the non-use of force in international relations. China also abstained from a General Assembly resolution that deplored Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 104 This makes China rather complicit in Russia’s invasion and atrocities being committed in Ukraine. China has equally condemned the sanctions the US and EU imposed on Russia. Although its foreign ministry called for restraint, following evidence of devastation committed by Russian troops, China has not explicitly called for a halt in Russia’s invasion. One could read into China’s behavior a change in its policy on absolute non-intervention, and maybe a plan to use the Russian pretext to invade Taiwan.

102 CHATZKY, A., MCBRIDE, J. China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative , at http://www.cfr.org/bacgrounder/ china’s-massive-belt-and -road-initiative/ (May 29, 2019). 103 FASSIHI , F. Russia vetoes a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for it to Withdraw from Ukraine , at http:// www.nytimes.com/2022/02/25/world/europe/united-nations-russia-withdraw-ukraine.html. 104 FASSIHI , F. The U.N. General Assembly passes resolution strong condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine , at https:// www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/russia-un-invasion-condemn.html.

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