CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

MICHAL PETR CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ emergency. First, the competition authority may decide to suspend the statutory deadlines; 62 and second, specifically for merger review, if the notification thresholds are not met in the time of crisis, it is possible to take into account a year just before it. 63 In the Czech Republic, no such specific legislation was adopted. We put forward that a legislation similar to that adopted in Slovakia, focused on problematic times in general, not just a specific crisis, would be a reasonable precaution for the future. 5. Conclusions From the very beginning of the pandemic, the antitrust world was cautioned not to over-react. 64 In two-years retrospect, these advises seem to have been headed. As we have shown above, not many actual changes in antitrust law and policy were directly connected with the COVID-19 pandemic. Some anti-cartel rules were relaxed for a short period of time with respect to several agricultural commodities. Some competition authorities indicated that they are prepared to be more lenient in their oversight over anticompetitive practices, they however remained within the borders of the Art. 101 (3) TFEU exemption; even though they offered guidance in individual cases, demand for it was negligible. This is not to claim that nothing has changed. The challenges that the pandemic put in front of the global economy expedited some processes, which had already been in place, including the shift to more ex ante regulation of the markets, 65 the new regulation of digital markets an services and foreign direct investments. These changes may be permanent, leaving less room for antitrust as we know it in many sectors, crucial for modern economy. 66 For the near future, however, we put forward that we need more robust guidance from competition authorities than we have received in the past years with respect to the pandemic. Especially the energy sector would benefit from clear guidelines, outlining the limits of legal cooperation. Similarly, competition authorities should clarify their position towards excessive prices, including the issue of dominance in specific “transitory” situations. Concerning other, more technical measures adopted during the COIVD-19 pandemic, we claim that competition authorities should enable access to file without the necessity of physically inspecting it on the authorities’ premises, even if only in a limited way (with the exception of data rooms, etc.). General rules that would enable the suspension of statutory deadlines in times of crisis would also be laudable.

62 Act No. 187/2021 Coll. on Protection of Competition, available at: https://www.antimon.gov.sk/data/ files/1765_act_187_2021_endocx.pdf?csrt=12526857127441913920 (accessed 22 July 2022), Sec. 49. 63 Ibid , Sec. 8 (5). 64 See e.g. BEJČEK, J. Výjimečná nakažlivost výjimek? [Exceptional Contagiousness of Exceptions?] AntiTrust , 2020, No. 1, p. 4. 65 See e.g. ŠMEJKAL, V. Od koronaviru k ex-ante antitrustu?! [From Coronavirus to ex-ante Antitrust?!]. AntiTrust, 2020, No. 2, p. 23. 66 See e.g. ŠMEJKAL, V. Vzpomínky na „normální“ antitrust [Memories of the „normal“ Antitrust]. AntiTrust, 2022, No. 2, p. 36.

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