CYIL vol. 13 (2022)

CYIL 13 ȍ2022Ȏ DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES OF THE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN CONFLICT democratic states, which terrorists consider a threat to their countries. 43 Nevertheless, even an armed conflict between the United States and the transnational terrorist network of Al Qaeda, despite its clear international aspects, could not be classified under international law as an international armed conflict. The reason for this is, that the international armed conflicts presuppose a clash between two or more states. All the rules that apply to this type of conflict are designed for states, and the nature of these rules presupposes the fulfilment of obligations stemming from these rules by the states. It would be very difficult to assume that Al Qaeda would be materially capable of fulfilling its obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict. Although the devastating force of the 9/11 attacks could satisfy the condition that the terrorist attack must be of such a nature and scale as to effectively equal an attack by armed forces, a sufficiently intense de facto link between Al Qaeda and Afghanistan has not been proven, therefore it is not possible to consider that Al Qaeda was a de facto state body of Afghanistan. The classification of the US armed conflict with Al Qaeda as an internal conflict with numerous international aspects could be considered more acceptable. However, this concept remains relatively unclear in terms of its content. Al Qaeda is a loosely organized terrorist network consisting of several units that enjoy a relatively large degree of autonomy. It is therefore problematic to claim that Al Qaeda has the necessary degree of organization required by international law. 44 In the author’s opinion, it can be similarly argued that the Hamas movement is rather materially unable to fulfil its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Nevertheless, the Hamas movement has had an organizational structure since its origin. Hamas is divided into two main fractions. The first one is political, social, or civilian, which mainly supports the poor Palestinian population, especially in the Gaza Strip. The second one includes the armed forces, which carry out attacks on the State of Israel and this faction is responsible for blasting the State of Israel from the Gaza Strip with various types of missiles and mortars. The command structure of Hamas is also divided into two parts. The domestic part, which is operating directly in the Palestinian territories, and the exiled part. Hamas’s activities are significantly financially supported by some Arab states, but there are also other sources of contributions, mainly from the Palestinian people. In 2006, Hamas won elections to the Palestinian National Authority. 45 For the people of Palestine, Hamas might be a religious alternative to the secular Palestine Liberation Movement. Hamas pursues two main goals, the first being a charity for the Palestinians, and the second pursuing terror against Israel. 46 Unlike Al Qaeda in relation to Afghanistan, Hamas can be found to be more politically linked to the “State of Palestine in the stage of birth”. Extremely harsh attacks by the armed forces are very common, for example in relation to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. However, the formal aspect of the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions remains problematic. On the other hand, terrorist bombings by suicide bombers or knife attacks on civilians, although highly brutal, could certainly not be considered acts of international terrorism in all cases due to the often-unclear role of these perpetrators (whether they act from their personal 43 IBL, op. cit. sub. 35, p. 158. 44 FUCHS, op. Cit. Sub. 42, pp. 273–274. 45 LAUB, Z., ROBINSON, K. What is Hamas. In: Council on Foreign Relations [online] 2021 [cit. 04.06.2022]. Available at: https://tinyurl.com/2mmbzh5e. 46 ČEJKA, M. Izrael a Palestina: minulost, současnost a směřování blízkovýchodního konfliktu. [Israel and Palestine: Past, Present and the Direction of the Middle East Conflict.] Prague: Center for Strategic Studies, 2005, pp. 173–176.

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