CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

JAN LHOTSKÝ handles the communications and prepares them for consideration to the experts, does not seem to be fit for the purpose. It is not only insufficiently staffed, but an audit revealed significant inefficiencies associated with manual paper-based procedures. 19 Due to old fashioned procedures as well as lack of staff, the petitions unit is able to prepare far fewer drafts than could be decided on by the committee. 20 The lack of use of up-to-date technology makes the processes of handling communications obsolete. Fifth, there is a considerable backlog of communications on the part of the committees, not only connected to the efficiency of the respective OHCHR unit but also to the amounts of communications received and the capacity of the committees as part-time bodies. 21 Within the last eight years, the backlog increased by 134% and at current capacity the committees would need approximately 6.5 years to clear it, without dealing with any new communications. 22 Sixth, it is obvious that the system creates a high burden on states , in Geneva sometimes called a ‘reporting fatigue’. Reporting to different treaty bodies and sending delegations for the reviews are time- and cost-demanding activities. As the reporting cycles are not coordinated among different treaty bodies, there could be a year when a state should prepare a number of different reports or send delegations for a dialogue with different committees. All of this is challenging mainly for small and developing countries. Seventh, as some of the specialized committees deal with issues also covered by the two covenants, there is a danger of overlaps or duplication , and even divergent interpretations by different committees. 23 This should be no surprise if we realize that all 10 treaty bodies together include 172 different experts. 24 There is a lack of institutionalized dialogue among members of the committees, which may result in duplicities with regard to state reviews, as well as in divergence with regard to the different committees’ jurisprudence. Eight, the independence and expertise of treaty body members differs . At the outset, I would like to voice my respect to the treaty body experts as they are voluntarily performing highly valuable work and it is due to their great efforts that the system under the given circumstances works. Nevertheless, due to the lack of formal requirements, 25 the nominations and elections are left to the states, which traditionally exercise vote trading (or ‘horse trading’) while negotiating support for their candidates. Some of the treaty body members may even 19 UNGA ‘Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’ (2021) UN Doc A/76/197 para. 24. 20 This relates mainly to the Human Rights Committee. See JELIĆ, I. and MÜHREL, L., ‘The Human Rights Committee – Challenges and Prospects for Enhanced Effectiveness and Integration’ (2022) 14 JHRP 17, 33–34. 21 In terms of communications received, the number was stable according to the Secretary-General report 2018 (n 14) para 24, and afterwards there was an increase of 80% according to the Secretary-General report 2020 (n 14) para. 16. Recently, there was a decrease of 34%, see Secretary-General report 2022 (n 7) para. 19. The majority of the communications are directed to the Human Rights Committee, i.e. 63% of all communications according to Secretary-General report 2018 (n 14) para. 24. Furthermore, the number of communications directed to the CESCR is also rising, see Secretary-General report 2020 (n 14) para. 16. 22 Secretary-General report 2022 (n 7) paras 21, 57. 23 In this regard it was suggested that the treaty bodies could be more selective in what issues they focus on. See KROMMENDIJK, J., ‘Less is more: Proposals for how UN human rights treaty bodies can be more selective’ (2020) 38 NQHR . 24 See OHCHR ‘Handbook for Human Rights Treaty Body Members’ (2015) HR/PUB/15/2, p. 20. 25 See for example Art. 28(2) of the ICCPR.

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