CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

JAN MALÍŘ CYIL 14 (2023) In this regard, the ECtHR departed from the view that Professor’s critical statements were value judgments concerning an issue of public importance, namely the appointment and the promotion system at universities. 100 As the ECtHR reminded, the truthfulness of value judgements is not susceptible of proof but there must be some link between value judgments and its supporting facts which is to be assessed on case to case basis. 101 In Professor Sorguç’s case, there could be, however, no a priori doubt over the existence of such a link because Professor’s value judgements built “on his personal experience in promotion panels and information which was already known in academic circles”. 102 The problem was national courts did not provide the Professor with an opportunity to substantiate his statements although he attempted to do so. 103 In particular, the Turkish Court of Cassation “attached greater importance to the reputation of an unnamed person than to the freedom of expression that should normally be enjoyed by an academic in a public debate”. 104 This was all the more serious that Professor Sorguç formulated his value judgements in the context of academic freedom “which comprises the academics’ freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work and freedom to distribute knowledge and truth without restriction”. 105 Under such circumstances, national courts failed to strike a fair balance between the interference with the Professor Sorguç ’s freedom of expression and the protection of rights of others. That also implied that the interference in question was not necessary in a democratic society and constituted violation of Article 10 ECHR. The significance of Sorguc v Turkey seems, thus, to be twofold. Firstly, the case provided the ECtHR with an opportunity to clarify that, in the context of academic freedom, freedom of expression is inseparably linked to freedom to pronounce on the functioning of academic institutions and, even, to criticize them as long as there is a reasonable link between such criticism and verifiable facts. Secondly, the ECtHR held the debate on functioning of academic institutions, including that on the academic appointments and promotion systems, concerns the issues of general interest. That qualification, in turn, implies that the scrutiny of any interferences with freedom of expression shall be strict. More recently, the ECtHR dealt with the freedom to criticize in the context of academic freedom in Kharlamov v Russia. 106 In this case, a professor at the Orel State Technical University in Russia was sued for defamation after he criticized the process of nomination of candidates to the academic senate at the conference convened to elect members of this senate. 107 In Professor’s view, the candidates were illegitimately and illegally selected at the meeting between the heads of departments, in the absence of any wider consultation or debate with the academic staff. 108 National courts, however, ruled in favour of the Orel Technical University, taking the view Professor’s statements were statements of fact and no breach of University internal rules was proven. 109

100 Idem, para 32. 101 Ibidem. 102 Ibidem. 103 Sorguç v Turkey (n 95) para 33.

104 Idem, para 34. 105 Idem, para 35. 106 Kharlamov v Russia, No. 27447/07, 8 October 2015. 107 Idem, para 8. 108 Ibidem. 109 Kharlamov v Russia (n 106) para 13.

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