CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

JAN MALÍŘ CYIL 14 (2023) obligation to base research on an honest search for truth” while emphasizing that “[t]eaching, research and scholarship should be conducted in full accordance with ethical and professional standards”. 135 The ECtHR’s case-law on accountability of individual academics may, thus, appear as a judicial manifestation of the same principles. 136 The ECtHR’s statements on academic accountability can be traced back at least till the end of the 1990s. By way of example, in 1999, Nilsen v Norway, 137 the ECtHR was called upon to decide on a case which arose from a series of disputes over the alleged violence of the Norwegian police. In these disputes, social scientists and representatives of the Police clashed. 138 Although none of the parties expressly invoked academic freedom, one of the key issue the case triggered was to what extent researchers themselves can be legitimately subject to criticism and how far this criticism can go, especially in a public debate. Significantly, in its ruling, the ECtHR indicated that, where critical statements over researchers, their ideas or their methods constitute value judgements, as long as such value judgements bear a link to facts, 139 such criticism can be legitimately made and is protected by freedom of expression itself. Moreover, as the ECtHR remarked, “a degree of exaggeration should be tolerated in the context of … a heated and continuing public debate of affairs of general concern, where on both sides professional reputations were at stake.” 140 Although Nilsen v Norway tackled the issue of academic accountability somewhat indirectly, it could have been inferred from the ECtHR’s ruling that even academics should not be immune from exercising their freedom of expression in an accountable way. This was confirmed in Lunde v Norway. 141 In that case, a Norwegian sociologist complained to the ECtHR over the violation of his freedom of expression after the Norwegian High Court ordered him to pay damages for the harm caused to a person whom he had named in his monograph on racism as a person with racist views and ties to racist movements. The problem was that no racist opinions or statements were proven with respect to that person. Moreover, the monograph contained incorrect facts concerning the same person. 142 When scrutinizing the necessity of interference with sociologist’s freedom of expression, stemming from the judgement of the national court, the ECtHR explicitly stressed the importance of academic freedom, present in the circumstances of the case. As it observed, “[a]ny restriction placed by the Contracting States on the freedom of academics to carry out research and to publish their findings calls for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court”, especially where this freedom of expression is exercised in the context of a debate on a matter of serious public concern, such as racism. 143 Yet, even under such circumstances, “Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee unlimited freedom of expression even 135 The UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-education Teaching Personnel (n 8) para 33. 136 It is worth noting, however, that the ECtHR does not generally refer to The UNESCO Recommendation or other soft law acts on academic freedom in its case-law, which deals with academic accountability. 137 Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway, No. 23118/93, 25 November 1999. 138 Idem, paras 7–28. 139 Idem, para 51. 140 Ibidem. 141 Henrik Lunde v Norway, 38318/97, 13 February 2001. 142 Idem, “The Law”. 143 Ibidem.

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