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JAN MALÍŘ CYIL 14 (2023) considers this autonomy to be a corollary of academic freedom and is willing to tailor the interpretation of the ECHR in line with requirements related to this autonomy. Conclusion In light of the foregoing, it is clear enough that concerns for academic freedom are rooted in the existing case-law of the ECtHR, especially, in the case-law rendered under Article 10 ECHR. Rather than an individual right of its own, related to any of the rights or freedoms enshrined in the ECHR, however, academic freedom appears as a “value-based” principle in the law of the ECHR. Under the existing case-law of the ECtHR, the primary role of this value-based principle is to guide the ECtHR in interpreting Article 10 ECHR or provisions on other rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR in cases in which individual academics or academic institutions are affected. As such, the position which academic freedom occupies in the existing ECtHR’s case-law resembles, inter alia , the role which the principles of self-determination or personal autonomy have played in the scrutiny of complaints over the compatibility of health interventions with the ECHR before the ECtHR. 198 Conversely, at least for the time being, it cannot be said that academic freedom would be recognized as an independent and individualized right by the ECtHR, stemming from provisions of the ECHR, as it happened in the past with, for example, the right to protection of personal data. 199 Although, thus, at present, there is a tendency to view academic freedom as an individual human right 200 or a fundamental right, 201 such perspective does not seem to apply under the ECHR, as currently interpreted by the ECtHR. In this respect, the position of academic freedom in the case-law of the ECtHR may rather remind of the position it occupies in some national constitutional systems. When describing the US situation, E. Barendt noted that “[o]n an alternative interpretation of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, it might be more accurate to refer to academic freedom as a constitutional value that shapes the interpretation and application of other constitutional 198 See e.g., MALÍŘ, J., and DOLEŽAL, T., Evropská úmluva o ochraně lidských práv a základních svobod a zdravotnictví [ European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Health ] (Wolters Kluwer, 2016) pp. 79–97; on the role of personal autonomy, see, recently, Vavřička and Others v. The Czech Republic, Nos. 47621/13, 3867/14, 73094/14 and others, 8 April 2021, para 334 and dissenting opinion of judge Wojtyczek thereto, para 7. 199 For a general overview, see e.g., Harris, D., O’Boyle, M., Bates, E. and Buckley, C., (n 19) pp. 538-540; see, also, ECHR, Factsheet – Personal data protection, December 2022, Retrieved 1 March 2023, https://www.echr.coe. int/documents/fs_data_eng.pdf. 200 Most importantly, this view was promoted in the Lima Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions, adopted by the World University Service in 1988, available at https://www.wusgermany.de/ sites/wusgermany.de/files/userfiles/WUS-Internationales/wus-lima-englisch.pdf; doctrinally, see, recently, e. g. WRIGHT, J., AVOURIS, A., FROST, M., and HOFFMANN, S., (2022) “Supporting academic freedom as a human right: challenges and solutions in academic publishing”, The International Journal of Human Rights , 26:10, 1741–1760, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2022.2088520. 201 This is especially the case of constitutional law of European States, such as Germany, see Barendt, E., (n 1) pp. 23–26; conversely, in the USA, academic freedom is not prevailingly perceived as an individual right bestowed on individual academics, on the US debate, see e.g., POST, R., “Academic Freedom and the Constitution”, in: BILGRAMI, A., and COLEP, J., Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom? (Columbia University Press, 2015) pp. 132–134.

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