CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

PETRA PRESSEROVÁ CYIL 14 (2023) analysis of relevant international standards and the decision-making practice of the CEDAW Committee, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the boundaries of due diligence can be relatively clearly defined. The analysed sources agree that application of a specific, particular due diligence in this regard must be required from the states. It should adequately reflect the specific vulnerability of victims of violence against women and the mechanisms of its emergence. 31 Also, it shall take into account the broader context of discrimination against women and any further disadvantages of certain victims (e.g., disabilities, background of marginalized ethnicity etc.). 32 Hence, the duty of the state to act non-discriminatorily, sensitively, with regard to the gender dimension of this violence and needs of victims, whilst bearing in mind the historical causes of this violence, is embedded throughout its obligations. 33 It has been established that the main obligations falling under this specific due diligence are: prevention, victim protection, proper investigation and prosecution of the crime, punishment of the perpetrator, and compensation of the victim . These obligations can be grouped into, the author postulates, two main categories: (1) obligations arising before the commission or escalation of a crime, such as the requirement of general prevention and partly also individual prevention, and (2) obligations activated after the crime has already been committed or has started, such as the duty to ensure investigation, punishment, and compensation, and also partly individual prevention. These main categories will be presented in following sub-chapters. 4.1 Before Violence Occurs: Preventive Obligations Chronologically the first obligation within due diligence is the state’s duty to ensure the prevention of violence against women. Sometimes, the obligation to prevent, and the obligation to ensure the protection of the victim are distinguished and separated. However, the author argues that at the core of the duty to protect the victim lies the synonymous need to prevent violence and its further escalation, even in a specific individual case. Therefore, in terms of terminology, it appears feasible to see the conceptualized obligation of prevention extensively as one, but further divide it into the (1) general obligation of prevention, corresponding to the duty of prevention sensu lato towards the wider public, potential perpetrators, and victims, and (2) individual obligations of prevention, corresponding to protection of the victim and prevention of violence or its escalation in a specific case. Each of them can be further divided into more specific duties. 31 Judgment of the ECtHR of 09.07.2019 in Volodina v Russia , no. 41261/17 , § 92; Judgment of the ECtHR of 22.10.2019 in Barsova v Russia , no. 20289/10, § 35; Judgment of the ECtHR of 11.02.2020 in Buturugă v Romania , no. 56867/15, § 67; Judgment of the ECtHR of 19.03.2019 in E. B. v Romania , no. 49089, § 60. 32 Report of the IACHR no. 80/11 of 21.07.2011 in Jessica Lenahan and others v United States, §§ 129–131, 164; Campo Algodonero, op. cit., § 258; Judgment of the IACtHR of 26.08.2021 in Bedoya Lima and others v Colombia , §§ 90, 126; Velásquez Paiz and others v Guatemala, op. cit., § 122. 33 Views of the CEDAW Committee of 29.11.2007 in Tayag Vertido v Philippines , no. 18/2008, § 8.8; Maria da Penha v Brasil, op. cit., §§ 3, 60, 6; IACHR. Informe Las mujeres frente a las violencia y la discriminación derivadas del conflicto armado en Colombia . 18.10.2006, no. 67, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. [online]. [Accessed 08.03.2022]. Available from: www.cidh.org/countryrep/colombiamujeres06sp/informe%20mujeres%20colombia%20 2006%20espanol.pdf, § 30; Judgment of the ECtHR of 28.05.2013 in Eremia v Moldova , no. 3564/11.

180