CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

JIŘÍ MULÁK CYIL 14 (2023) the evidence is apparent from the concrete facts and, at the same time, there is no legitimate explanation for the Court of Appeal’s action. 83 These specific facts may consist, for example, if the Court of Appeal imposes inconsistent instructions on the appellant; after the previous instructions have been complied with, it comes up with new instructions concerning facts or evidence that have not changed since the first decision. It indirectly suggests to the appellant what findings of fact or how to evaluate particular evidence would stand up before the Court of Appeal; repeatedly instructs them to evaluate evidence from different points of view, even though they could have done so the first time and the situation has not changed significantly since the evidence was first taken; imposes on them an instruction which they consider necessary for the objective clarification of the case, but does not insist on compliance with it after the Court of First Instance has failed to comply with it but has changed its findings of fact to the satisfaction of the Court of Appeal. Repeatedly imposes on them vague and general instructions (e.g., The Court of First Instance has made a special effort in that regard and has repeatedly addressed the issue, even though it has reached the same result each time; expresses, directly or indirectly, its opinion on the reliability of the evidence (in particular on the credibility of a witness, accused, co-accused or expert); operates, without actually taking evidence, openly or implicitly on a finding of fact which the Court of First Instance did not make at all or even excluded; applies a different standard of rigour to the reasoning of the Court of First Instance depending on whether or not it relates to findings of fact with which it agrees. Or it relaxes its initially high standard of reasoning when the Court of First Instance adopts its preferred conclusions or, if the Court of First Instance changes its conclusion which it had originally reasoned in a logical and convincing manner, it accepts a change in that conclusion which is consistent with its own view, without the Court of First Instance addressing its original reasoning and explaining why it has departed from it. 84 6.2 Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (Case No. IV. ÚS 2980/22) The second key and recent decision is the ruling of the Constitutional Court Czech Republic, Case No. IV. ÚS 2980/22 . 85 In the criminal case of the complainant (the accused), several decisions of the Court of Appeal were overturned and the case was returned to the Court of First Instance. In her constitutional complaint, the complainant argued, in particular, that the district court had repeatedly found in favour of the complainant, and only as a result of impermissible pressure from the regional court did it finally find her guilty. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic found in favour of the complainant, upheld the complaint, and annulled the contested decisions. In the present case, there was so-called judicial ping-pong, i.e., the repeated return of the case by the Court of Appeal to the Court of First Instance for a (new) decision. In simple terms, the Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court in Prague had unconstitutionally interfered with the findings of fact of the district court and thus forced it to decide on the complainant’s guilt. 86 With regard to the legal conclusions, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic stated that the violation of Article 36(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

83 Decision No. I. ÚS 1365/21, §§ 72–74. 84 Decision No. I. ÚS 1365/21, § 74. 85 Decision of the Constitutional Court case No. IV ÚS 2980/22 of 21 March 2023. 86 Decision No. IV. ÚS 2980/22, §§ 3–31.

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