CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

CYIL 14 (2023) VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE … (2022–2025) and previously served as a member (2019–2022) and Vice-Chair of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and its Special Rapporteur for the Follow-up process to Concluding observations. Among others, she serves as ad hoc judge at the European Court of Human Rights; an arbitrator and a Bureau member of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within OSCE; an expert of the OSCE Moscow mechanism on Human Rights; and a Vice-President of the Slovene Red Cross. She (co-)authored and (co-)edited numerous articles/books in the field of international law, and, among other professional affiliations, acts as a President of the Slovene Branch of the International Law Association (ILA). Email: vasilka.sancin@pf.uni-lj.si. 1. Introduction According to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 all States have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including for electricity production. 2 The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine is the largest nuclear power plant (NPP) in Europe and among the ten largest in the world. Among many other grave concerns about the devastating consequences of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 3 the ongoing armed hostilities also brought world-wide attention to a significant risk of nuclear disaster. 4 In addition to Russia’s initial occupation of the Chernobyl reactor complex, 5 the forces shelling and occupying the Zaporizhzhia NPP, has become the centre of an ongoing nuclear safety crisis, as the fighting in and around NPPs entails a high risk of devastating short and long-term effects for civilians and the natural environment. The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, expressed ‘extreme concern by the shelling at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant several times, which underlines the very real risk of a nuclear disaster that could threaten public health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond’ and urged that the 1 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161, Articles IV and V. 2 See also International Law Association, Report of the 78th Conference held in Sydney, 2018, Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law, 4th Report: ‘Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes’, pp. 816–865. 3 Various mechanisms of international organisations, including the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicihr-ukraine/ index), the OSCE Moscow Mechanism missions (see e.g., SANCIN, V. ‘The Role and Impact of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism Reports Following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’ (2023) 23 International and Comparative Law Review, issue 1) and the International Criminal Court, in addition to other regional or transnational, alongside national, mechanisms, are collecting information and evidence of alleged violations of international law. 4 This in addition to the unacceptable ‘nuclear rhetoric’ used by Russian officials. See e.g., UN News. “Ukraine war: Risks of spillover ‘remain all too real’, Security Council hears”, 16 November 2022 and Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, A/HRC/52/62, para. 13. 5 The events concerning Chernobyl raise interesting issues regarding Russia’s motivations and uncertainties with regards to applicability of heightened protection as provided under IHL, but the Chernobyl situation is not in focus of this contribution. On these topics see, for example, MORGANDI, T. and BETIN, B. Legal Implications of the Military Operations at the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plants (2022) EJIL: Talk! https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-implications-of-the-military-operations-at-the-chernobyl-and-zaporizhzhya nuclear-power-plants/ [accessed 1 July 2023].

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