CYIL vol. 14 (2023)

CYIL 14 (2023) VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE … not liable under this Convention and which that individual caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage. 68 These modifications, although not (yet) applicable to the Russian Federation and Ukraine, elucidate some important aspects relevant for interpretation of the VCCLND, and signal that even in situations or emergency and armed conflicts, the liability for nuclear damages needs to be established within the applicable legal framework, international or/and domestic. 3.2 The role of the Vienna nuclear liability regime in the context of hostilities against and around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant The liability and/or responsibility for any nuclear incident arising from situation of an armed conflict requires identification of relevant actors (State and individuals) and depend(s) on the applicable legal regime and its interpretation. It is not the purpose of this article to enter into the discussion of distinctions between concepts of liability as opposed to responsibility, accountability of a State as distinct from the individual one, nor does it intend to discuss these issues under the domestic law of the States involved. The aim hereinafter is rather to investigate what is the role of the VCCLND in this context and how does it fit within the applicable international legal framework. The seizure of the Zaporizhzhia NPP by Russia is undisputed, thus at the State level, Russia has the responsibility to ensure the safety and continued operation of the NPP, including enabling the safe and secure operation of the NPP. The alleged continued shelling directed at or from the NPP by Russia has periodically disabled the facility’s connection to Ukraine’s electrical power grid, risking a radioactive leak. Due to the unprecedented nature of the occupation of the NPP by Russia, the IAEA established essential safety safeguards to be followed and implemented, since the applicable nuclear security regime does not provide a clear legal framework that could comprehensively cover such circumstances. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict in Ukraine, according to the IAEA Director General Grossi, are: 1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained. 2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times. 3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure. 4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites. 5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites. 6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures. 7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others. 69 68 See Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Information Circular, IAEA, INFCIRC/566 (22 July 1998) https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc566.pdf [accessed 1 July 2023]. 69 See https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-statement-to-united-nations-security-coun cil [accessed 1 July 2023].

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